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Plum Creek Timber Company currently owns about 808,000 acres of land in the state of 
Montana. The present incarnation of Plum Creek is the result of several corporate 
reorganizations of the Burlington Northern Railroad, itself the result of the merger of 
the holdings of the Great Northern Railroad Company and the Northern Pacific 
Railway Company. The Northern Pacific is a land-grant railroad, that is, the US 
government awarded the railroad with grants of land along the length of the track in 
order to help finance construction of the line. It is the remnants of this land grant that 
constitute the bulk of Plum Creek's land holdings in Montana today. 
From 1880, when the first lengths of NP track crossed Montana's eastern border, until 
the present, the people in charge of the land holdings held different objectives in 
dealing with the land. Until about World War II, managers pursued an aggressive land 
sale policy to decrease land holdings in return for monetary payments, and acted 
primarily as custodians of the land. As the value of the timbered land holdings 
increased following the war, management reassessed the value and created a market 
for its timbered holdings by entering a series of long-term timber supply stumpage 
contracts with mills. This marked the beginning of managing the land to produce j 
timber, and the railroad hired professional foresters to oversee the management. As 
soon as the markets for the timber were in place at the conclusion of the contracts, 
management abandoned stumpage sales, but continued to harvest trees through 
selective sales of logs at a rate projected to equal regrowth, under the guidance of Bob 
Binger, a trained forester who headed resources from 1968-1981. This practice continued 
through Northern Pacific's corporate merger with Great Northern in 1970, and later 
through reorganization as BN Timberlands, a part of the larger holding company of 
Burlington Northern, Inc. in 1981. In 1983, BN merged its timber operations, which by 
this time included several mills, into one company, known as Plum Creek Timber 
Company, that still operated under the holding company. Soon after timber operations 
were merged, Plum Creek abandoned its policy of cutting timber as fast as it could 
reasonably regrow it in favor of a vastly accelerated cut. Interviews with former and 
present company employees and with people familiar with the company point to a 
variety of factors involved in the sudden corporate decision to cut more trees: Changes 
in the inner and external corporate environment, personnel, market demand, and 
regulation all contributed to the decisions to escalate the cut on Plum Creek lands. In 
addition, changes in the level of timber harvest were paired with changes in the type 
of harvest, as Plum Creek relied increasingly on clearcutting to deliver its timber 
volume. 
The science of sustained-yield forestry, so important during the Binger era of 
timberlands management, was abandoned by Plum Creek during the 1980s, when 
management practices were more heavily influenced by the business environment than 
by the tenets of forestry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to Charlie Grenier, a vice-president of the company, 
Plum Creek Timber Company has "hundreds of thousands of acres of 
merchantable timber to harvest. [Plum Creek's] policy is to harvest, 
replant and grow timber into perpetuity. That's what makes [Plum 
Creek] valuable—handling [Plum Creek's] timberlands otherwise 
would not only be unethical, it would be dumb."1 
Grenier states that, today, Plum Creek is managing its timber 
holdings "into perpetuity," but this has not always been company 
policy. Even within this stated policy aim, how various company 
managers have carried out this directive has varied sharply over time. 
Plum Creek, which owns about 808,000 acres of timberlands in 
Montana, came into possession of the timberlands through land grants 
in the 19th century to a Plum Creek corporate progenitor, the Northern 
Pacific Railroad. The land grant to the Northern Pacific extended from 
Minnesota to Washington, and the company concentrated on selling 
the land whenever possible to raise funds. It was only after World War 
II that the company began to manage its timberlands in Montana for 
wood and fiber production, and first hired foresters to oversee the 
woodlands. 
1 Devlin, Sherry. 1991. "Plum Creek growls at 'unfair' ad," Missoulian, 22 November: 
p B-3. 
1  
Trained foresters in the United States at this time were heavily 
influenced by Bernhard Fernow and Gifford Pinchot, the "fathers" of 
forestry in the US. Fernow and Pinchot, enamored with the Germanic 
forest model, championed the concept of a "regulated" forest, in which 
harvest levels were equal to growth (harvests based on growth could 
never deplete a forest, so the forest would produce in perpetuity). This 
was the beginning of the concept of sustained-yield forestry in the US. 
In the popular notion of the public, in fact, "forestry" became 
synonymous with "sustained-yield," as a response to the widespread 
deforestation that had already occurred in the US; forestry was 
portrayed by Pinchot, et al, as means to end destructive timbering and 
provide timber supplies for the future: community stability 2 
Foresters soon found the concept of only cutting as much as was 
growing too constricting. Most of the woodland was comprised of old 
growth, so the concept of sustained yield changed to cutting as much as 
the productive capacity of the forest rather than actual growth rates: 
cutting levels based on estimated potential rather than reality. This 
traditional Germanic approach to forestry was the basis of the 
curriculum of the forestry schools in the US, including the University 
of Montana. Foresters coming out of the training institutions in 
"merchantile Germany didn't have a technology base, they relied on 
tradition. In the US, we have technology and no tradition; tradition is 
2 Parry, B Thomas, Henry Vaux & Nicholas Dennis. 1983. "Changing Conceptions Of 
Sustained -Yield Policy On The National Forests," Journal of Forestry, 81(3): 151. 
last year's tennis shoe. Technology has always bailed this country out, 
and that is what we rely on."3 
3  
Management of the present Plum Creek timber holdings 
changed as the notions of how to manage the forest shifted with 
changes in management personnel. This thesis examines the land-use 
management of the land-grant timberlands that have ended up in 
Plum Creek ownership from the awarding of the grants to the present 
day, and it details the conflict between the tenets of scientific forestry 
and the drives of managers responding to varying business 
environments in timberland management on the Plum Creek 
timbered lands. 
3 Goetz, Hank. 1991. Interview. 15 November. Former Northern Pacific forester and 
current manager of the University of Montana's Lubrecht Experimental Forest. 
ORIGINS OF LAND GRANTS 
"Pioneering don't pay": As Andrew Carnegie knew, 
homesteading in the American West in the 19th century was a perilous 
and arduous undertaking. Settlers had to uproot themselves from 
their homes and move to a new and strange environment, often to 
undertake a completely different form of livelihood. Many 
homesteaders came from the states already established in the United 
States, and many, like Per Hansa in Ole Rolvaag's Giants in the Earth, 
came from foreign lands. Many settlers, like Per Hansa, also 
succumbed, for one reason or another, to the power of the 
environment into which they had transported themselves. Pioneering 
was usually a test of survival, and not a highly profitable venture, it 
truly did not "pay," but the pioneering spirit of adventure and new 
opportunities captured people and drove them west nonetheless. 
In the mid-19th century, the spirit of Manifest Destiny, and later, 
Progress, caught the imaginations of Americans and emboldened them 
to move out into the territories and make the land their own and in so 
doing, strengthening the powers of American civilization on the 
continent. Obvious lures awaited the daring overland adventurer: the 
apparent promise of abundant minerals, rich soil, and tall trees. In 
short, the resources from which to derive a profitable income 
seemingly sat awaiting the arrival of somebody to take advantage of the 
opportunity these resources allowed. However, obvious hindrances 
also deterred potential pioneers from moving into the territories. Life 
in the territories was hard; conveniences common in the East, such as 
4  
roads and mail service, were infrequent, and a settler's life was often a 
lonely and danger-fraught affair. 
The government, eager to tie the various outlying regions of the 
country and its territories closer together, wanted settlers occupying the 
far reaches to hasten the "Americanization" of these lands. The federal 
government therefore subsidized railroad line construction with grants 
of public land to railroad builders in order to hasten the construction of 
a web of railroads across the continent. 
North America was largely agrarian during the formation of the 
United States. Thomas Jefferson believed that man found his greatest 
virtue when he was working and living as a yeoman on the land. In 
order to have a nation of virtuous citizens, in the Jeffersonian view, 
the government should act in favor of maintaining and enhancing this 
class of independent and self-reliant person in all cases. Jefferson 
viewed the budding development of cities and their worker and 
merchant classes with suspicion; he believed that the self-reliance 
inherent in yeomanry and essential to inherent virtue in humans was 
lacking in city-dwellers, and he therefore advocated a government that 
would favor an agrarian way of life.1 
The Constitutional Convention passed over Jefferson's ideas for 
governance of the United States in favor of James Madison's 
mechanistic model of government, but the agrarian ideal remained a 
1 See, generally, Sullivan, William. 1986. Restructuring Public Policy- (Berkeley: 
University of California Press). 
strong current in American thought. The government made public 
lands available cheaply for settlers so that each person had the ability to 
live on his own piece of land if he desired. The government 
encouraged settlers to move west to new lands and to spread 
"civilization" farther across the continent. By 1819 European 
settlements had spread to the Great Bend of the Missouri and trade had 
been opened up with Sante Fe.2 Oregon had established settlements 
prior to 1843, but the discovery of gold in California started such a huge 
rush of people that Oregon was soon eclipsed in popular fancy and 
commercial reality.3 No longer just a trickle of bold adventurers, a 
steady stream of people moved west. The nation as a whole got caught 
up in the fervor of Manifest Destiny — the idea that the continent was 
meant to be "American" from sea to sea — and technological 
developments such as steam power served to expedite the push across 
the continent, as they allowed people easier access to land they could 
call their own. 
As technological innovations allowed the steam railroad to lay 
its lattice across the eastern seaboard and points west, Americans took 
note of the relative advantages of railroads. Whereas the benefits of a 
railroad over nonmotorized traffic are somewhat obvious, railways 
were really not any cheaper than waterway traffic. But the speed, 
flexibility of service, adaptability to short hauls, and, most importantly, 
the convenience of locating, all gave the railroad an advantage over 
2 Atwater, Elizabeth Rodgers. 1937. "Letters of Montgomery Meigs Written While 
Engaged in the Survey of the Northern Pacific Railroad 1872-1873." (Unpublished 
Master's Thesis, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana) p 
3 Cotroneo, Ross. 1966. "The History of the Northern Pacific Land Grant 1900-1952." 
(Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho) p 10. 
water traffic.4 As industrialization developed, the railroads played an 
increasingly important role in shipping raw materials and goods from 
centers of supply to places of demand. In addition, wherever a railroad 
went, it tended "to attract factors of production to its right of way"; it 
was, in Keynesian terms, a "multiplier": Railroads sparked demand for 
labor and capital goods wherever they went, and hence their presence 
led to more rapid development of an area.5 
Congress, in the early-to-mid-19th century, was well aware of the 
economic boost railroads applied, and was favorably disposed towards 
railroad development. One avenue Congress could take to encourage 
development and to offset the high cost of railroad construction was to 
offer the public domain as security for the inducement of private 
capital to build the road.6 As Representative Freeman of Mississippi 
noted in 1851, the purpose of land ceded to the federal government was 
to dispose of the public debt and build up new states; offering land 
grants as security for the development was "the surest mode of 
increasing the public revenue, and encouraging growth of new 
Republican states in our domain."7 In Congress, though, sectional 
differences dominated activity; two areas supported land grants, the 
manufacturing east and the western areas of the public domain. The 
old South and former frontier states with no public land "had nothing 
4 Jenks, Leland. 1944. "Railroads as an Economic Force in American Development," 
Journal of Economic History 4(1 ):13. 
5 Jenks. p 7. 
6 Harnsberger, John. 1956. Jay Cooke and Minnesota. (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press), p 2. 
7 Haney, Lewis. 1910. A Congressional History of Railways in the United States 1850-
1887. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press) p 16. 
to gain and possibly something to lose by handing out what they 
regarded as the common treasure of the nation."8 
By the mid-forties, both the Democrats and the Whigs favored 
use of public lands to encourage railroad building, and by 1856, the 
Republican party platform also favored land grant aid to build a 
railroad to the Pacific.9 Congress supported the view that the 
advantage of a railroad lay in its aid to development: If a railroad were 
in place due to a land grant, adjacent federal lands would increase in 
value, thus federal income from land sales would increase. Commerce 
in the area would increase, and states would benefit from tax income 
gained from land occupants. The US would also benefit from cheaper 
and improved postal service and military transport, since the land 
grants issued by Congress included these stipulations. Proponents of 
land donation had confidence that virtue was on their side, and the 
railroad enterpriser of the day "considered himself an agent of 
civilization, and embodiment of collective purpose."10 
Even though Congress willingly donated land to aid in 
construction of railroads, the land grant itself did not guarantee the 
success of the road. The grants were simply an enticement to attract 
investors and underwrite construction of the line. No conservative 
investor would throw his funds into a project without some sort of 
guarantee on a return. The land associated with a grant gave investors 
8 Overton, Richard Cleghorn. 1941. Burlington West: A Colonization History of the 
Burlington Railroad. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) p 77. 
9 Cochran, Thomas. 1950. "Land Grants and Railroad Entrepreneurship," Journal of 
Economic History 10(supl):54. 
10 Jenks, p 10. 
the surety of something solid in return for their investment.11 
Without the security of land, obtaining investors to hazard dollars for 
the venture would have been next to impossible. 
A general concept behind the land grants was essentially that the 
railroad would sell the granted land and use the money earned 
through the sale to finance road construction. However, capital for 
construction had to be raised in advance, and net proceeds from land 
accrued gradually over time. So in the beginning, land simply 
provided additional security for mortgage bonds. The railroads did not 
assume official ownership of the lands (via issuance of a patent from 
the General Land Office) until they had built a specified length of track. 
After government inspectors validated the quality and distance of 
track, the GLO sent out surveyors to plat the land. Only after the land 
was platted could the railroad select lands that constituted its grant. In 
the case of the Northern Pacific, after each twenty-five miles of track, 
the GLO surveyors would come out to plat the land, and only then 
could NPRR select lands from the area around the previous twenty-
five miles. In a sense, the railroad was expected to put the cart before 
the horse: it had to build the railroad to get the land to sell in order to 
finance the rail it had just built. Given this lag time in getting return 
from granted lands, speculative capital, despite its "undesirable moral 
connotations" and "parasitic" nature, was essential to the growth of a 
pioneer industry like railroading.12 
11 Cochran, p 60. 
12 Grodinsky,Julius. 1962. Transcontinental Railway Strategy. (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press) p 179. 
Speculative investment was necessary because prudent investors 
"had acquired somewhat of an early prejudice against the value of 
western land."13 Unfortunately for railroads hoping to solve initial 
financial difficulties via land grants, previous investment in remote 
and cheap real estate had yielded poorly, and investors were aware that 
quick and substantial returns were very unlikely from investments in 
remote areas of public domain.14 Despite unwillingness on the part of 
investors, public opinion, as it reflected in Congress, was in favor of 
railroad development, and if the public had to give up chunks of the 
public domain to pry speculative investment for railroad construction, 
it was willing to do so. States' rights advocates (most of whom were 
southern) in Congress had reservations about granting federal land 
directly to a federally-incorporated entity such as the NPRR; they 
favored granting land to the individual states and allowing the states to 
distribute grants as they individually saw fit. Congress, therefore, 
usually found a way to approve land grant requests — either by 
granting federal land to individual states for them to turn over to 
corporations of their own creation, or by a direct federal land grant for 
the transcontinental roads — primarily because it saw gifts of land as 
the nation's role in sponsoring railroad development.15 
13 Cochran, p 58. 
14 Cochran, p 58. 
15 Smalley, Eugene V. 1883. History of the Northern Pacific Railroad. (New York: GP 
Putnam's Sons) p 100. 
ORIGIN OF THE NORTHERN PACIFIC 
The concept of a railroad line to the Pacific was intriguing for 
entrepreneurs as early as 1834, when Dr. Samuel Bancroft Barlow, a 
practicing physician living in Granville, Massachusetts, wrote 
numerous articles and editorials in favor of public funds financing a 
railroad from New York to the mouth of the Columbia.1 Eleven years 
passed before Asa Whitney first attempted to influence Congress to 
sponsor a northern route to the west coast in 1845. Initially, the 
northern route was a subject of derision; as late as 1852 members of 
Congress ridiculed the northern route as a plan "to build a railroad 
through a barren, uninhabited, frozen region."2 Proposals from 
Whitney and several rival groups each had regional backing, and the 
impending Civil War heated up the intersectional debate. Eventually 
Congress passed a bill in 1853 authorizing survey of the four most-
favored routes to the Pacific because Congress could not agree upon 
which one route to survey. Upon completion of the surveys, Jefferson 
Davis, then Secretary of War—whose department had sponsored the 
surveys—recommended construction along the 32nd parallel.3 
Sectional rivalries, however, still prevented agreement in Congress. 
After extensive deliberation, in 1862—when southern voices were 
absent from the vote—Congress awarded the Union and Central Pacific 
the first land grant to build a railroad to the Pacific.4 
1 Smalley, Eugene V. 1883. History of the Northern Pacific Railroad. (New York: GP 
Putnam's Sons) p 53. 
2 Schwarm, LL. 1956. "Resume of Northern Pacific Railroad Land Grant Act of July 2, 
1864, and Amendatory and Supplemental Legislation, Subsidiary Grants." Unpublished 
Document compiled by NRPW Land Commissioner LL Schwarm. p 1. 
3 Smalley, p 78. 
4 Harnsberger, p 8. 
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Even though Congress did not favor the northern route for the 
first transcontinental railroad, it did not rule out the possibility of 
support for a northern route in the future. Josiah Perham, a merchant 
from Maine who had picked up where Whitney had left off in support 
of a northern route to the Pacific, won a charter from Congress in 1864 
entitled, "An Act granting Lands to aid in the Construction of a 
Railroad and Telegraph Line from Lake Superior to Puget's Sound, on 
the Pacific Coast, by the Northern Route" for a line running north of 
the 45th parallel. Many prominent people of the times, including 
Ulysses S. Grant, John C. Fremont, John Mullan, and William H. 
Wallace, were named as incorporators, and Lincoln signed the act on 2 
July, 1864. This charter marked the beginnings of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad (NPRR). The charter granted the NPRR 400 feet of right-of-
way for the length of the road, and also granted twenty alternating odd-
numbered sections per mile of track (12,800 acres/mile) laid in the 
states, and forty alternating odd-numbered sections per mile (25,600 
acres/mile) constructed in the territories.5 Of the proposed route of 
the NPRR at the time of the grant, Minnesota and Oregon were the 
only states already formed, while North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and 
Washington were still territories. Under terms of the charter, NPRR 
had to select its land grant within fifty miles of the railroad line. The 
charter also called for initial construction to start by 1866, and required 
completion by 1876. 
5 13 Stat. 356. 
Even though Congress placed the guarantee of land behind the 
Northern Pacific venture, the NPRR had trouble getting the project off 
the ground. Perham hoped to finance the NPRR through a large 
number of small stock subscriptions, but his plan failed to get enough 
supporters to begin construction. It was only when Jay Cooke, the 
renowned Civil War financier, put the power of his banking firm 
behind the enterprise that it assumed serious proportions.6 Cooke 
sought and received from Congress a two-year extension on initiation 
and completion of construction in both 18667 and 1868,8 though the 
1868 extension set the completion date at 1877. 
The original NPRR charter did not allow the issuance of bonds 
without congressional consent, so Cooke obtained consent to issue a 
bond to be secured by mortgage in 1869,9 and a bond to cover 
construction and equipment in 1870.10 Construction on the railway 
finally began on 15 February, 1870, when ground was broken near 
Duluth. On 1 July, 1870, NPRR mortgaged all of its properties to Jay 
Cooke as security for the payment of bonds not to exceed $125 million. 
NPRR issued $30 million in bonds to sponsor construction and built 
529 miles, from Duluth to Bismarck, and also laid track from Kalama to 
Portland in the West, in 1870-73. To finance the NPRR, Cooke relied 
on tactics that he had used with great success to raise funds during the 
^ Clinch, Thomas. 1965. The Northern Pacific Railroad and Montana's Mineral Lands," 
Pacific Historical Review 34(3): 325. 
7 14 Stat. 355. 
8 15 Stat. 255. 
9 16 Stat. 346. 
10 16 Stat. 378. 
Civil War.11 For a short time the bonds sold well enough to supply 
construction costs, but by late in 1872 the railroad became pressed for 
funds to continue construction. Cooke's first plan was to sell the bulk 
of the bonds in Europe, but he could not interest the Rothschilds to 
make a major investment; later the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian 
War in Europe halted European investment almost entirely.12 Cooke 
then turned to an advertising campaign to sell the lands on the 
domestic market. The bonds were speculative in nature and fairly 
high-priced, and this, combined with widespread rumors of 
mismanagement, contributed to poor sales in the United States. 
Under terms of the grant, the company could not sell land to 
settlers until a stretch of track had been finished and inspected by the 
government and the land surveyed. Because NPRR President Smith 
was afraid that the track was not of good quality because workers were 
building it with unheard of speed, NPRR managers did not invite 
government inspectors to view the construction until October of 1872 
(whereupon inspectors found the track thoroughly favorable), so the 
NPRR could not receive land sales income until after that time. 
Without income from land sales, the line was forced to rely on traffic 
alone for the bulk of its income. By 1872, bonds sales were not bringing 
in enough money to cover the costs of construction, and workers were 
often not paid on time.13 The interest due on the bonds turned out to 
be more than the profits from the short spans of track could support, 
11 Renz, Louis. 1973. The Construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad Main Line 
during the Years 1870 to 1888. (Walla Walla, Washington: Self-Published) p 7. 
12 Oberholtzer, Ellis Paxson. 1907. Jay Cooke, Financier of the Civil War. 
(Philadelphia: GW Jabobs) Vol 2, p 147. 
13 Oberholtzer, pp 305, 387. 
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and Cooke's huge banking firm collapsed under the pressure of trying 
to support the bond.14 
The NPRR went into receivership on 1 May, 1875; this meant 
that the bondholders who had put up all the money for Cooke secured 
control of the NPRR. The stockholders of the NPRR during Cooke's 
reign had been only a few very rich people, while the bondholders had 
been mostly normal middle-class people who put in small amounts of 
money, largely because of the reputation of Jay Cooke, the financier 
extraordinaire. These people formed a bondholder's committee, 
headed by George Cass, James Moorhead, and Frederick Billings, to 
assume management of the line.15 
Cooke's attempt to run the NPRR out to the Pacific demonstrates 
the difficulty of relying on a land grant to finance construction. 
...the land grant itself could not by itself solve the 
problems of financing a railroad in a sparsely settled 
frontier area, particularly with a depression setting in... 
and with promoters who were less interested in building 
the line than in the possible quick profits from stock and 
land manipulation.... A grant of land would normally 
stimulate some flow of capital to a railroad project, but it 
could not by itself guarantee success. Its effectiveness was 
always conditioned by the state of the development of the 
territory to be traversed, the availability of other sources of 
capital to get the road built, and the entrepreneurial and 
14 Dagget, Stuart. 1908. Railroad Reorganization. (New York: Houghton Mifflin) p 
265. NP President Smith got sacked for his hesitancy to have the rail inspected, which 
prevented the NP from receiving grants of land and the subsequent income from land 
sales. The collapse of Cooke's highly-respected bank led to the widespread Panic of 
1873. 
All three men thus entered the place-name bonanza. Moorhead, Minnesota, Cass 
County, North Dakota, and Billings, Montana, and Billings County, North Dakota. 
managerial ability of the men in charge of the 
enterprise.16 
In order for a railroad to make money, it had to be able to retire debt 
through sale of grant lands, and if there was no demand for sale—as 
was the case for the NPRR—the financial state of the railway would be 
jeopardized. 
As long as a railroad kept pace with settlement by expanding 
with demand instead of rushing ahead of the demand, it could keep a 
steady market for traffic on the line. Even though railroads could get 
more land through additional trackbuilding, the smart investor 
preferred to keep pace with settlement. The best security for the 
railroads were the lines themselves, and their future as traffic carriers, 
and not the land grants that came with construction.17 The method to 
turn a profit on a railroad was to make sure that a large traffic demand 
dictated where to lay tracks. Therefore, the NPRR preferred to sell its 
granted land to settlers, not speculators, and it wanted to sell it quickly 
and cheaply to create a demand for traffic. Over a period of time the 
settler's traffic was going to be worth more to the railroad than the 
initial sale of the land because of the settler's freighting payments. The 
NPRR recruited settlers heavily to promote this traffic; this resulted in 
a settler population that stretched out onto the plain along the tracks, 
instead of a more evenly bunched expansion. Many communities 
owed their existence to the railroad: The rails took transportation to 
16 Rae, John. 1952. "The Great Northern's Land Grant," Journal of Economic History 
12(2):144. 
17 Rae, p 142. 
places that would not have had much commercial existence if it were 
not for the railroad running through it. 
Having learned its lesson once, a reorganized NPRR under 
Frederick Billings set out to complete the line in 1879. The NPRR 
cautiously arranged separate mortgages to finance small stretches of 
track (from Bismarck to Glendive and from Wallula to Sandpoint) 
initially,18 and construction began anew. By 1880, with the European 
war over, prosperity had returned to the extent that investors again 
had money to finance ventures. 
On the west coast, meanwhile, an entrepreneur named Henry 
Villard was running his Oregon Railway & Navigation Company line 
very near the planned route of the NPRR through Oregon and 
Washington, and he and the NPRR began to squabble about pre­
eminent rights.19 Villard had experienced a jump in income from 
$750,000 to $2.5 million—too much of a good thing to want to share— 
so he did not want the NPRR coming into his sphere of trade. Villard 
settled all arguments by forming a "blind pool" to gather investment 
capital: He asked potential investors for money, but did not inform 
them to what purpose he intended to use their capital in hopes of 
protecting his intentions from the NPRR. Initially, Villard hoped to 
gather $8 million, but investors blindly entrusted him with $12 
million. With this capital, Villard created a holding company that 
18 Schwarm, p 9. 
19 Villard originally had been sent to Oregon to stabilize and reorganize interests held 
by a group of German bankers. He was so intrigued by the possibilities that he bought 
out many of the German interests himself. See, generally, Villard's Memoirs. 
bought the controlling interest in the NPRR in 1881 before the NPRR 
could act to protect itself.20 He was elected President of the NPRR board 
and assumed active direction of the company. 
Construction proceeded rapidly under Villard. The tracks 
reached Billings by 8 September, 1882, and on 8 September, 1883, the 
Navigation Company joined the NPRR at Gold Creek, Montana, and 
the Lake Superior to Puget Sound connection was complete.21 
Unfortunately, it seems that Villard did not learn from Cooke's 
experience, and due to a "grave underestimation" of the costs of 
construction, Villard's financial empire collapsed, and he resigned on 
16 December, 1883, because the company was bankrupt. Once again, the 
rail traffic volume was not enough to support interest returns for 
investors. After Villard's holding company collapsed, new 
management extended the NPRR line through Idaho to Tacoma so 
that the NPRR would not be dependant upon Villard's Navigation line 
to reach the coast.22 
The NPRR took out several more mortgages, in 1883, 1887, and 
1889, in efforts to keep the trains rolling, but defaulted on them all 
during the Great Panic of 1893, whereupon federal court enacted 
foreclosure proceedings. James Jerome Hill, who had by this time 
privately financed the construction of the Great Northern (GN) 
railroad from St Paul to Seattle, and whose line weathered the Great 
20 Villard, Henry. 1904. Memoirs of Henry Villard - Journalist and Financier, 1835-
1900. (New York: Houghton Mifflin) Vol 2, pp 85, 299. 
21 Northern Pacific Railroad Company Annual Report of 1882 and 1883. Gold Creek is 
near Garrison, Montana. 
22 Grodinsky, p 141. 
Panic of 1893, believed that the NPRR failed because it did not pay 
attention to "proper development," by which Hill meant building 
feeder-branch lines along the main line to encourage increased freight 
traffic.23 The NPRR, under pressure of possible forfeiture of its land 
grant (see discussion in a later section), finished its mainline at the 
expense of creating a feeder-branch line network. Building such a 
network would have assured a population increase and increased 
traffic, as it had for Hill. 
JJ Hill, together with a consortium including JP Morgan, had 
attempted to buy the NPRR in 1895. The consortium made an offer to 
buy the NPRR to its receiver, Edward D. Adams, and to two 
representatives of the Deutsche Bank, its financial institution, and the 
three men decided to accept the offer. However, one GN stockholder, 
afraid that acquiring the shaky NPRR would hurt his GN stock, tested 
the buyout based on Minnesota law that unification of parallel and 
competing railroad lines was against the law. The Supreme Court 
upheld the stockholder's opinion, so Hill and his compatriots bought 
into the NPRR as individuals, and they reorganized the NPRR over 
into the Northern Pacific Railway Company (NPRW).24 In a sale of 
property directed by the court, all properties of the NPRR25 were sold 
to the NPRW on 15 October, 1896. JJ Hill thus assumed control of both 
the GN and NPRW. 
23 Holbrook, Stewart H. 1955. James J Hill, A Great Life in Brief. (New York: Alfred A 
Knopf) p 125. 
24 Holbrook, p 128 & Pyle, JG. 1917. Life of James J Hill. (New York: Doubleday) pp 17, 
24. 
25 All lands were sold to the NPRW except the lands in Minnesota and east of the 
Missouri River in North Dakota, which were not subject to the three mortgages that 
were foreclosed; NPRW later bought these lands under public sales in 1899. 
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The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy (CB&Q) operated track from 
Chicago to Denver, with a line that extended as far north and west as 
Billings. JJ Hill had his eye on the country covered by the CB&Q as 
potential markets for timber from the Northwest and grain from the 
Midwest areas that his lines already covered, and he coveted the CB&Q. 
EH Harriman, who controlled the Union Pacific Railroad just south of 
the CB&Q, had the same designs on the CB&Q as Hill, and he offered 
Hill a chance to split the pie, but Hill wanted it all. In 1904, he started 
buying up all the loose CB&Q stock that he could under the names of 
GN and NPRW in equal parts, eventually purchasing $107,611,000 of 
the $110,839,100 total in CB&Q stock, or 97 per cent.26 Harriman then 
tried to enter the game via the back door by purchasing all the loose 
NPRW stock he could find and perhaps gain control of the Northern 
Pacific and access to the CB&Q that way. Unfortunately for Harriman, 
his search for NPRW stock pushed the price up enough to alert Hill 
that something was amiss, and Hill was able to buy up enough NPRW 
stock to remain in control.27 
In order to protect his railroad holdings from raids similar to the 
Harriman attempt on the NPRW, and to reach reapproachment with 
Harriman, Hill formed the Northern Securities Company on 12 
November, 1901. Northern Securities was a huge holding company 
26 Moody's Railroad Manual 1907, p 734. Moody's put out an annual that summarized 
the business of all railroad companies. Later, the name changed to Moody's 
Transportation Manuel, and is only one of several annuals now compiled by Moody's. 
2^ Cotroneo, Ross Ralph. 1966. "The History of the Northern Pacific Land Grant 1900-
1952." (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho) p 27. Arno 
Press published Cotronoeo's dissertation in book form in 1979. Hereinafter referred to as 
"Cotroneo 1966." 
that controlled the NPRW and the GN, and because the GN and 
NPRW held the majority of stock in the CB&Q, Northern Securities 
controlled the CB&Q as well, thus Hill controlled most of Montana's 
railroad trackage.28 The resulting company was so gigantic that no one 
could hope to buy or even bother it. Hill viewed the new company as a 
"labor-saving device" that would lower rates and increase dividends 
because of the "security, harmony and relief from various forms of 
waste" that the company would provide.29 The Supreme Court, 
however, ruled on 14 March, 1904,30 that the Northern Securities 
Company violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890. The Court 
ruled that it was not necessary to prove that competition had been 
reduced by the formation of the holding company. The offense was 
obtaining the power that Northern Securities had.31 Hill then had to 
break up the company and the Great Northern, Northern Pacific 
Railway, and the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy continued on as 
before. 
During World War I the government took over operation of the 
nation's railroads as a matter of national security, and the railroads 
were not returned to private management until passage of the 1920 
Transportation Act. This Transportation Act exempted railroads from 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, so GN, NPRW, and the CB&Q 
28 Martin, Albro. 1971. Enterprise Denied: Origins of Decline in American Railroads, 
1897-1917. (New York: Columbia University Press) p 100. 
29 Hill, James Jerome. 1910. Highways of Progress. (New York: Doubleday, Page & 
Co.) p 131. 
30 193 US 197. 
31 Hofsommer, Don. 1989. Public Address, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, 1 
May. Hofsommer is a noted railroad historian whose works include a history of the 
Great Northern and a history of the Southern Pacific; he currently teaches history at 
St Cloud State University in Minnesota. 
once again attempted consolidation. In 1922, the three roads 
announced that they had agreed on the terms of consolidation, and 
that the resultant entity, the Great Northern Pacific Railway Company, 
would improve service and lower capital costs. Returns on 
investment in the Northwest were lower than in other areas of the 
country because they had long stretches of track with relatively few 
people to serve. At any rate, they argued, it would only affirm reality, 
because 61% of the capital stock of GN and NPRW was held by the 
same stockholders.32 
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) finally ruled early 
in 1930 that the merger would benefit the public because of reduced 
rates and better service, and approved the merger. One of the 
conditions of approval, however, was that the NPRW and GN divest 
themselves of the CB&Q. The relative value of the CB&Q was greater 
than that of both the GN and the NPRW—it was the best money 
maker of the three—and GN and NPRW had no intentions of giving it 
up, so the case went back for more hearings. As the Stock Market Crash 
of 1929 deepened into depression, both political figures and labor 
leaders feared that consolidation would mean fewer jobs, and 
pressured the ICC to dismiss the merger case, which it did in 1931.33 
Although the 1920 Transportation Act opened the way for the 
"natural" consolidation of railroads in the US, the Depression of the 
1930s, then World War II, then upgrading stock and converting to 
32 Hofsommer, 1 May, 1989. 
33 Hofsommer, 1 May, 1989. 
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diesel-driven motive power kept railroaders' minds occupied with 
other things.34 Consolidation of the GN, NPRW, and the CB&Q did 
not come into serious consideration again until the late 1950s. 
34 Hofsommer, 1 May, 1989. 
THE NP LAND GRANT 
Montanans awaited the arrival of the railroad with great 
expectations of the enhanced development and faster settlement of the 
state that was sure to ensue when the railroad arrived, but they also 
regarded the land grant associated with the railroad with some 
trepidation. In 1874, the Territorial Assembly asked Congress to rescind 
the land grant in favor of direct cash subsidies, partially to hasten the 
arrival of the line, and partially to transfer the land grant into other 
ownership where territorial legislators felt it might prove more 
beneficial to Montana: 
A half century hence the government will have 
received directly more than any aid it need render, while 
indirectly it will have received compensation one 
hundred fold; but a half century hence the immense 
grants of land will probably become elements of discord 
and sources of disturbance to the various states then 
constraining them....1 
Whatever apprehensions Montanans may have felt about the 
huge chunk of Montana land that was scheduled to be turned over to 
NPRR after it laid track in the state were outweighed by the prospect of 
having a railroad to ship products from their mines and fields. Several 
subsidy bills were introduced in the territorial legislature to aid railroad 
construction in the state. For example, in 1876, the Governor of 
Montana Territory, BF Potts, signed three subsidy bills, one that offered 
NPRR $3 million dollars, secured by bond, to lay 350 miles of track west 
of Glendive, one that offered the Utah Northern Railroad (a subsidiary 
1 Montana Laws (1874)177-180. 
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of the Union Pacific) $1.15 million to connect Helena to the Union 
Pacific, and one that authorized $750,000 in county bonds to assist a 
Helena-Fort Benton railroad. Subsidy proponents justified the bond 
issues on the increased tax revenues a railroad would bring to the 
territory. All three were offered in referendum to the electorate, 
pending railroad acceptance of the subsidy. The Utah Northern 
rejected the subsidy offer, and the NPRR subsidy as well as the Fort 
Benton-Helena line subsidy were rejected in referendum. The subsidy 
offers arose at virtually every session of the territorial legislature, but 
no subsidies were ever awarded.2 In 1877, the legislature passed a 
resolution asking Congress to hasten the construction of the NPRR 
line through issuance of $18,720 per mile of US government bonds in 
lieu of the land grant;3 this was summarily ignored by Congress. In the 
end, railroads came to Montana despite any actions of the territorial 
citizenry: Jay Gould and Sidney Dillon's railroad, the Utah & Northern, 
became Montana's first railroad when it crossed Monida Pass on 9 
March, 1880. The NPRR soon followed Gould's line into Montana.4 
The NPRR tracks finally crossed the North Dakota border into 
Montana in early December of 1880 and the line to the Pacific was 
completed near Garrison, at Gold Creek on the afternoon of 22 August, 
1883. A formal celebration and ceremonial last spike followed on 8 
2 Myers, Rex C. 1972. "Montana: A State and its Relationship with Railroads, 1864-
1970." (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Montana, Missoula, 
Montana) pp 20-64. This section of Myers' dissertation deals in depth with the 
material covered in the above paragraph. 
3 Montana Laws (1877)p 440-441, and Myers, p 50. 
4 Myers, p 60. 
September, 1883.5 On 13 September, 1883, the final construction crew of 
about 200 men received their final paychecks in Missoula, and the 
town was the "scene of a wild weekend."6 
On 21 February, 1872, the NPRR had filed its general right-of-way 
through Montana with the federal government to indicate its planned 
route through the state. This right-of-way platt called for construction 
to cross the Rockies over Deer Lodge Pass, near Butte, and documented 
the withdrawal of granted lands as provided by the NPRR charter land-
grant of 1864. It was NPRR's understanding that it had first pick of all 
odd sections that fell within its grant charter limits. However, many 
settlers were already in place before the NPRR even received its grant, 
and more moved into what would eventually become the NPRR 
grants limits long before the NPRR ever got around to construction. 
The difference between the projected line in 1872 and the definitive 
line in 1880-1883 also contributed to still more settlers locating in lands 
that NPRR would later claim as its property. Most of Montana was 
unsurveyed, and settlers would just settle in likely spots, unaware 
whether where they lived was in an even or odd section, because most 
of the state was unsurveyed 
As the NPRR began to claim the odd-numbered sections due it 
under terms of the grant, disputes arose with the inhabitants of many 
of those sections, who claimed the land was rightfully theirs due to the 
5 Peterson, Robert L. 1969- "The Completion of the Northern Pacific Railroad System 
in Montana: 1883-1893," in The Montana Past. Michael Malone & Richard Roeder, eds. 
(Missoula: The University of Montana Press) p 156. 
6 Renz, p 46. 
Pre-emption Act or Homestead Act of 1862. Congress allowed for these 
settlers with the Indemnity Act of 22 June, 1874,7 which gave settlers 
permission to stay on their land even if they were within the grant 
limits. The Indemnity Act also gave the railroad the right to select lieu 
lands in compensation for the lands already occupied by settlers. 
Under this Act, the NPRR was given another ten miles on either side 
of the line from which to select lieu lands, so the belt of land from 
which the railroad could select stretched to sixty miles on either side of 
the track. Congress later passed legislation on 21 April, 1876s that 
confirmed the homestead and pre-emption rights of settlers on grant 
lands who had been on the land before any railroad land withdrawals 
were received at the local Land Office. Then the Act of 14 May, 1880,9 
extended pre-emption rights to those who settled with the intent of 
homesteading on unsurveyed lands.10 
Congress had favored land grants to aid railroad construction 
because it believed that it was acting on behalf of the common 
American. When railroad land grants began in 1850, public domain 
land was generally available to Americans only if they bought it. Land 
was quite cheap, but the government still exacted a price for it. As 
immigration pressures compounded, (and in the absence of Southern 
legislators) Congress passed the Homestead Act of 1862, which allowed 
settlers free access and title to surveyed federal lands, provided they put 
in the requisite time and improvement on the property. As more and 
7 18 Stat. 194. 
8 19 Stat. 35. 
9 21 Stat. 140. 
10 Schwarm, pp 17, 21. 
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more homesteaders appeared in the West, the railroads and 
homesteaders found themselves increasingly in conflict over the 
ownership of parcels of land claimed by both settlers and the railroads. 
The courts found themselves faced again and again by suits brought 
against some settler or another by the NPRR, or initiated by a settler 
against the NPRR. As in the case of the Northern Pacific Railroad 
Company v Amacker ,11 the Supreme Court consistently ruled in favor 
of the individual: 
It was long ago said by this court that "the policy of 
the Federal Government in favor of settlers upon public 
lands has been liberal. It recognizes their superior equity 
to become the purchasers of a limited extent of land, 
comprehending their improvements, over that of any 
other person"....There is no real hardship in enforcing this 
rule, for if the individual seeking to maintain his 
homestead entry fails by reason of any defect he has no 
recourse on the Government for the fees he has paid or 
for any compensation for the time and labor he has 
expended, while on the other hand the general provision 
of railroad land grants is to the effect that if the general 
title to any tract within the place limits fails the company 
may reimburse itself by a selection within the indemnity 
limits. It is not therefore strange that the rulings of the 
land department, as well as of the courts, have been 
uniformly favorable to the individual contesting with a 
railroad company the right to a particular tract of land. 
Later, by the Act of 1 July, 1898,12 NPRR had the right to lieu selections 
for selected lands already occupied, but the settler was also given an 
option of swapping his present claim for another somewhere else. 
Thus the compensation extended to both parties. 
11 175 US 564, 567. 
12 30 Stat. 597,620. 
The Homestead Act had been in effect for two years by the time 
the NPRR received its land-grant from Congress; even though the 
NPRR was offering land cheaply, federal land was free, so initially the 
NPRR was not as successful as it had hoped in selling its grant lands.13 
Even by the time that Henry Villard wrested control of the NPRR, he 
recognized that the NPRR had "two interests to cultivate—that of the 
company as owner of a line of traffic, and that as a landowner."14 
Despite its best efforts, the NPRR was in the landownership game to 
stay. 
Congress, meanwhile, went through a heyday of land-grant 
giveaways from 1850-1871, eventually handing out over 150,000,000 
acres for railroad grants, "aside from the scores of applications that 
were turned down."15 Eventually, however, the results of the land 
grants were not always what Congress intended; many Americans not 
uncommonly referred to land grants as "steals," "grabs," and "land-
gouges," and Congress discerned that land-grants were "no longer 
economically desirable."16 Congress became aware that, over time, 
once the initial rush that accompanied the arrival of the railroad 
ended, land grants were hurting and hindering the settlement of the 
continent, not helping it. The idea to aid individual settlement 
opportunities had turned into a benefit for the large corporations. 
Gates, Paul. 1954. "The Railroad Land-Grant Legend," Journal of Economic History, 
14(2): 145. 
14 Cochran, p. 62. 
15 Overton, p 78. 
16 Haney, p. 23-33. 
In fact, a movement began in Congress to return the land grants 
to the public domain. This movement followed three paths in 
Congress: One was the forfeiture of all lands that the railroad had not 
earned by the charter deadline. (For the NPRR, this would have meant 
forfeiture of all land west of Bismarck.) Another path called for the 
forfeiture of all lands if the railroad had not met its charter deadline— 
which was, in fact, what most land-grant charters stipulated. (The 
NPRR would have forfeited all of its grant under this avenue.) The 
third and most lenient path pursued in Congress demanded only a 
forfeiture of those lands granted that the railroad had not yet earned. 
Sentiment in the House of Representatives reached its apex in the early 
1880s, when it passed legislation requiring railroads to forfeit all lands 
if the charter deadline was not met. The Senate, however, would not 
pass the bill, and objected to any compromise in joint committee, so 
the House effort amounted to naught. Eventually this fervor in the 
House waned, while anti-land-grant sentiment waxed in the Senate 
until 1890, when Congress passed legislation that forfeited all unearned 
grants. 
The NPRR did, however, build the road, albeit somewhat 
tardily, and it was not forced to forfeit its land grant. The railroad did 
it's best to sell the land it was granted. As soon as the railroad built a 
segment of at least 25 miles in length, it could call in government 
surveyors to survey the area around the road, and upon completion of 
the survey, it was free to select its 40 odd-numbered sections of land per 
mile of road. According to provisions of the Act of 31 July, 1876,17 the 
17 19 Stat. 121. 
NPRR was also obliged to pay the government for the "selection, 
survey and conveyance of the land" before the title would be patented 
to the railroad. The survey had to be a government survey; the NPRR 
could pay for its own, independent survey, but nothing was official 
until the government surveyor shot his lines.18 Incidentally, land was 
granted to the railroad in units of sections, not acres. If a surveyed 
section turned out to be 550 acres or 730 acres instead of the usual 640, 
that was the amount of acreage patented to NPRR. When it selected 
lieu lands, NPRR selected section or partial section directly in 
compensation for section or partial section, regardless of acreage. There 
was no guarantee of 640 acres, and the US was not required to make up 
deficiencies.19 
If lieu selections were located in the additional ten mile limit 
outlined by the granting act in 1864, they were known as First 
Indemnity selections, and if they were located in the additional ten 
miles added on by the Act of 1870, they were known as Second 
Indemnity selections. If NPRR wanted to select lands from the Second 
Indemnity belt, it had to prove that no selections were available from 
the First Indemnity belt, the land loss had to have ocurred between the 
granting act and the filing for definite location, and all selections had to 
occur in the same state as the loss. 
Under the conditions of the 1864 grant, the NPRR could not 
select lands that were "mineral" in nature. That is, lands that were to 
18 US v Montana Lumber & Manufacturing Co, 196 US 573. 
19 159 US 349. 
be determined by government survey to have mining potential that 
was not beyond the costs of a prudent man to extract with "reasonable 
expectation of success in developing a paying mine."20 Lieu selections 
for mineral lands could only be located within the boundaries of the 
First Indemnity. If the lands patented to the NPRR were later found to 
be mineral in nature, the railroad was allowed to keep the section in 
question, based on a lawsuit in 1913, unless the original classification as 
"non-mineral" was found to be fraudulent.21 This is how the NPRW 
later found itself in possession of valuable "mineral" land, such as the 
vast oil reserves in the Williston Basin. 
Later, as the US government established some national parks 
and reserves, lands selected by the NPRR that fell within these 
boundaries were compensated with lieu selections.22 In making these 
lieu selections, the NPRR was not limited by particular mile of track or 
even state boundaries, it could choose land from within the indemnity 
limits from anywhere along its route. For example, when the US 
formed the Mt Rainier National Park Reserve in Washington and the 
Priest River Forest Reserve in Idaho, some of the land the NPRR chose 
in compensation lay in Missoula County, Montana.23 These lieu 
selection agreements, however, were unusual. 
In 1898, the federal government set aside 1,259,151 acres within 
the First Indemnity limits and 1,174,993 acres within the Second 
20 US v. Bullington 51 LD 605,1926. 
21 Burke v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. 324 US 669. 
22 30 Stat. 11, 30 Stat. 34, 30 Stat. 36. 
23 Missoula County Deed #36:493,36:494. 
Indemnity limits as national forest reserves, and withdrew the land 
from possible lieu selection by the NPRW. The railroad, however, 
submitted a selection list in 1905 for about 5,000 acres of surveyed land 
in Montana that fell within the previously-created forest reserve. This 
opened considerable debate between the government and the 
railroad.24 Eventually, the debate whether the federal government, by 
creating forest reserves, could deprive the railroad of lieu selections, if 
the land remaining open within the indemnities was not enough to 
satisfy the losses within the original grant limits, was carried to the 
Supreme Court. The Court ruled in favor of the Northern Pacific, 
saying that, in effect, a contract is a contract, and the government had to 
live up to its contractual obligations despite later designations.25 
By 1920, the land grant was deficient by about four million acres, 
and large chunks of the designated national forest reserves fell within 
the indemnity limits. Then-Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace, 
alarmed at the prospect of the potential loss of four million acres out of 
the public domain, urged both Congress and President Calvin Coolidge 
to test in court whether the NPRW had complied with its land grant 
obligations, in the hopes of dismissing any further railroad claims on 
forest reserve lands. In 1924, Congress established a joint committee of 
inquiry, which eventually recommended, in 1929, in favor of a suit to 
bring settlement. Congress then passed a bill26 to bring suit to alter the 
24 Cotroneo 1966, p 357. 
25 US v. NPRW, 256 US 51, 1921. 
26 46 Stat. 41. 
original grant to allow the US to retain any land within federal 
reservations.27 
The United States filed suit in the District Court of Eastern 
Washington. The courts appointed a Special Master to look into the 
case, and the Master recommended that the court rule in favor of the 
NPRW, which it did. The court then sent the case back to the Master to 
determine adjustments and valuations. The Master reported back to 
the court that the NPRW was due 1,453,061 acres outside of the forest 
reserves in compensation for the land that the federal government 
wished to withhold from selection inside the forest reserves.28 In 
general, the right of substitution had to be granted the railroad so it 
could accrue the proper amount of sections due to it under the terms of 
the grant. 
Meanwhile, Congress had authorized an appeal of the decision 
to the Supreme Court.29 In US v. NPRW ,30 the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Master's recommendations were proper. In addition, the 
Supreme Court also affirmed the right of the federal government to 
withdraw reserve lands from selection as long as it offered substitute 
land for selection. Both sides then agreed to a settlement in which the 
NPRW agreed to relinquish claim on 300,000 acres and the federal 
government agreed to discharge its contention that portions of the land 
grant selections were erroneous or ill-gotten.31 
27 Cotroneo 1966, pp 363-365. 
28 Master's Second Report, pp 133-140. 
29 49 Stat. 1369. 
30 311 US 317,1941. 
31 US v. NPRW, 41 F.Supp. p 273. 
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Congress had in the meantime passed the Transportation Act of 
1940, which gave all land grant railroads one year to file for any lands 
due them under their land grants. This Act also ended the cut 
government rates for shipping on land grant railroads, and stated that 
the railroads would not have to forfeit to the US any lands they had 
already patented. The final decree on the case was finally issued on 28 
August, 1941, by the District Court of Eastern Washington, and the 
Northern Pacific land case came to an end. 
EARLY MANAGEMENT OF THE GRANT LANDS IN MONTANA 
Eventually, the Northern Pacific ended up with 39,021,693 acres 
of public domain through the land grant, of which 14,729,500 were in 
Montana. The railroad, of course, hoped to sell it all quickly.1 (See 
Figure 1 on page 37 for ownership data over time.) In 1869, NPRR 
established a Land Department to oversee the sales of the land and to 
promote settlement, as well as to control the timber and mineral lands. 
The NPRR was hoping to stimulate both townsite development, 
through sale of platted sites to potential merchants on pre-determined 
town sites, and through sale of agricultural land to farmers. By 1897, 
NPRW gave up on town lot sales and concentrated on agricultural 
sales, largely because, although so many townsites were dismal failures, 
the railroad still had to pay a higher tax rate on the land.2 
NPRR/NPRW attempted to limit sales whenever possible to genuine 
settlers to gain the benefit of the increased freight traffic the settlers 
would generate, but recurrent bouts of low cash flow in the company 
made it resort to occasional large sales to land speculators.3 Lands in 
Montana were offered for sale through issuance of price lists that 
indicated which lands were for sale and the price per acre at which 
NPRR, and after 1896, NPRW, was offering the lands. These lists were 
widely circulated throughout the US and Europe as advertisements for 
1 Schwann, p 216, & Cotroneo, Ross. "Northern Pacific Railway's Land-Grant Sales 
Policies," Montana, The Magazine of Western History, 37(2): 40. Hereinafter 
"Cotroneo 1987." 
2 Hudson, John. 1985. "NPRR, Mainstreet of the Yellowstone Valley," Montana, The 
Magazine of Western History 35(4):58, 62. 
3 Cotroneo 1987, p 45. 
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TOTAL LAND OWNERSHIP IN ACRES 
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This graph depicts the total land ownership of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad and its corporate heirs over time. The NP sold huge acreages 
around the turn of the century , which is clearly evident on the graph, 
to buyers such as Weyerhauser and the Anaconda Company, Source: 
NPRR Annual Reports, NPRW Annual Reports, Moody's Railroad 
Manual, BN Annual Reports, PC Annual Reports. 
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land sales, though the railroad was not above exaggerating the 
agricultural potential of the eastern Montana plains. A railroad 
advertisement brochure, A Guide to the Northern Pacific and its Allied 
Lines, boasted that the area crossed by the road was "exceeded by no 
other part of the United States in its wealth of natural resources, nor 
surpassed in any of the conditions of the soil which are best adapted to 
the well being of the human race."4 
From its first Montana land sale in 1883, NPRR/NPRW had a 
general policy of retaining any subsurface rights when it sold land. 
Although, beginning in 1915, it released these rights on some of the 
land after it had determined by geological examination that the land 
held no probable subsurface value.5 
The general policy of the company was to keep land prices fairly 
low to expedite sales: "I believe we will be better off with money in the 
bank than to wait for the possible increase in values," wrote NP 
President Thomas Elliott to Second Vice-President JM Hannaford in 
1917.6 Lands in western Montana were considered undesirable 
compared to lands in the eastern part of the state because of the 
relatively poor soil. Price lists in 1917 offered western Montana lands 
at an average of $3.55/acre while eastern Montana lands were offered 
4 Northern Pacific Railroad Company. 1880. A Guide to the Pacific and its Allied 
Lines. The railroad used brochures such as this extensively in an effort to attract 
settlers to the region. 
5 Schwarm, p 216. According to Missoula County deeds, a major exception to this general 
rule of retaining subsurface rights was NPRW's sale of over 100,000 acres of timber land 
to the Anaconda Copper Mining Company in 1899, in which the subsurface rights were 
transferred as well. 
6 NP Papers, President's File 176. 
at an average of $6.81 /acre. Although sales in the east were fairly 
steady, sales in the west lagged, simply because most settlers hoped to 
make their livelihoods on farms, and the eastern landscape was much 
more conducive to this.7 
Land sales in Montana followed the general success of the crops 
in the field; a series of good years would lead to an increase in sales, 
while a few bad years would lead to slower sales. Sales in the timbered 
west were always slow. The only people who tried to buy land in the 
west were lumbermen, and they tried to buy only timber whenever 
possible.8 In Montana, NPRW preferred to sell the land itself with all 
the timber on it in order to relieve itself of the tax burden and get 
money in the bank rather than accept stumpage bids just to cut and 
haul away the trees. As NP President Elliott commented, "...I think it 
would be sound policy in most cases, when we sell timber to try to get 
the purchaser of the timber to take the mountain lands off our 
hands."9 However, the timbered lands in Montana were generally so 
remote from established means of transportation that they were 
largely unsalable because of the difficulty of accessing the timber.10 
Even though Montana timber sales were negligible, NPRW had a great 
deal of success selling its timbered holdings in Washington and Idaho, 
where demand for the timber was steady from 1900 on. This success 
made the railroad confident of the future value of its Montana forested 
land, despite the low demand for it, because timber supplies elsewhere 
7 Cotroneo 1966, p 193. 
8 Cotroneo 1987, pp 201,207. 
9 President's File 452E-55. 
10 Land Department Annual Report, 1919, p 3. 
were diminishing and the demand for timber was increasing.11 As the 
demand and, consequently, the value of timbered lands gradually 
increased, it became more and more worthwhile for the railroad to 
retain these lands instead of trying to get the lands off the tax rolls.12 
If a lumberman wanted to cut trees on NPRW land, he would 
approach the Land Department with an offer for the stumpage on a 
particular piece of ground, and the company would accept or reject the 
bid based on a number of factors, as NPRW President Elliott outlined to 
his Vice-President Charles Donnelly in 1920: 
The main factors upon which timber values are 
based are as follows: species, stand, quality (which includes 
the elements of defect), accessibility to transportation, local 
logging conditions, danger from fire (which is accentuated 
where logging is going on or has been conducted in the 
vicinity), isolation from other bodies of timber. While 
these factors must all be taken into consideration, an 
application to the case in hand is sometimes quite difficult 
and much depends upon the experience and judgement of 
the cruiser. It must be remembered that the best Railway 
timber has been sold. The bulk of what is left is isolated, 
difficult of access, more or less defective and generally 
speaking, not particularly attractive.13 
Timber sales in Montana never amounted to much before the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Depression slowed things down 
even more. From 1927 to 1940, sales of land and timber were at a 
virtual standstill. With the advent of World War II, however, sales 
picked up, and by 1942, the lumber producers could not keep pace with 
11 Land Department Annual Report, 1921, p 36. 
12 Cotroneo 1966, p 274. 
13 President's File 452E. 
the market, due largely to labor shortages since much of the labor force 
had joined the military and gone off to war. Demand and projected 
demand for timber grew to such an extent by 1943 that the Land 
Department adopted a new policy of reserving the bulk of the 
company's young timber for future needs, and essentially stopped 
selling timber land. The NPRW also started specifying minimum size 
limits on its timber sales, and allowed only larger, old-growth trees to 
be cut by sawyers. Most of the vast tracts of NPRW timberland in 
Montana were still untouched at that time, and the company 
earmarked most of it for future cross-tie production.14 
The timber industry as a whole began to feel, via the US Forest 
Service, the influence of the federal government in timber 
management. By the Acts of 20 March, 192215 and 28 February, 1925,16 
the Forest Service was allowed to enter into exchanges for privately-
held lands within the borders, or within six miles of the borders, of the 
National Forests. The exchanges could be satisfied by trading an equal 
amount of public land or by allowing an equal value of timber to be cut 
from public land. The NPRW had land in several National Forests 
that was cut-over, burned-over, or contained only scattered amounts of 
timber, and the railroad wanted to dump the land to get out of tax 
burdens and fire protection charges that were growing larger than the 
value of the land. The Forest Service (USFS), of course, wanted title to 
the lands to facilitate more efficient administration and reforestation, 
14 Cotroneo 1966, pp 307,303-304. 
15 42 Stat. 465. 
16 43 Stat. 1090. 
42 
so title transfers between the NPRW and the USFS were not 
uncommon.17 
In the years leading up to the Second World War, the Forest 
Service began agitating for better logging practices on the nation's 
timbered lands. Federal agencies started to advocate federal control of 
all the nation's timberlands, public as well as private, the result of 
which would have been federal regulation of all forest industries. 
Several states introduced forest practices acts in their legislatures, but 
none passed into law until many years later. NPRW recognized the 
threat that all the attempted regulation posed for it, and tried to beat 
back the regulatory onslaught by establishing tree farms in some cut 
over areas, as well as pushing a publicity campaign: 
There is a public relations angle to this movement. 
The lumber industry is now realizing that it is being 
seriously challenged by the socialistic tendencies of the 
times, and must make some definitive contribution along 
conservation lines if the interested public is to be 
convinced that private industry is just as capable of 
perpetuating the forests as governmental agencies. If the 
challenge is not met, further power and authority by the 
Federal Government over state and private forests may be 
expected.18 
NPRW realized then that its timberland holdings were valuable 
enough to maintain in railroad ownership, and that the earnings 
potential of the forest land no longer was greatest in the disposition of 
the land, but rather in its retention and management as timber land. 
17 Schwarm, pp 247-248. 
Land Department File 18880,1943, pp 41-45. 
TIMBER MANAGEMENT 
The primary method of lumbering in western Montana at the 
turn of the century and into the first four decades of this century was 
railroad logging, complete with large logging crews and camps. The 
railroad sold most of its most-easily accessed timberland in Montana to 
the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, in several big sales, and to the 
Big Blackfoot Milling Company, in a series of small sales, around the 
turn of the century. It made small spot sales of timber virtually every 
year to western Montana lumbermen.1 Lumbermen would lay a small 
stretch of railroad track to access these sales, usually along a stream 
grade, then haul in a locomotive overland with freight draft animals to 
run on the track. The Big Blackfoot Railway, constructed up the 
Blackfoot River Valley, was built for logging in this manner. 
Typically, sawyers using seven-foot crosscut saws would cut 
down every merchantable tree within two or three miles of the 
railroad grade, resulting in an "economic selection cut," in which a tree 
had to be 14 inches in diameter at breast height (dbh) before it was 
valuable enough to "pay its way out of the forest."2 Because cutting 
down trees with crosscut saw involved a significant energy and time 
investment, sawyers would generally only cut down trees that were 
merchantable, and leave the crooked, partially rotten, flawed and small 
trees standing. Using oxen left over from the construction of the 
1 Missoula County Deed #57:16,20,138. 
2 Goetz, Hank. 15 November 1991. Personal Interview. Former NP forester and current 
manager of the University of Montana's Lubrecht Experimental Forest. Potomac, 
Montana. 
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Northern Pacific and Great Northern railroad lines, or draft horses, 
teamsters would then haul the logs to the train track at the valley 
bottom to be loaded on flatcars for transfer to McNamara Landing, at 
the present site of Johnsrud Park, on the Blackfoot, where the logs 
would be dumped in the river and floated, or decked on the ice to await 
ice breakup. Later, steam donkey yarding equipment allowed some 
mechanical hauling of logs down to the railroad, but sawyers still had 
to cut every tree with crosscut saws. When one area of merchantable 
trees was cut, workers would tear up the track and lay it down 
somewhere else and cut everything merchantable there: constant, 
connected high-grading.3 
After the logging, crews would practice "jackpot burning." The 
logging crews usually did not methodically slash the remainder of the 
non-merchantable trees, rather, they would set fire to the bigger 
accumulations that had been piled inadvertently. Due to all the fuel 
scattered about, these fires spread widely. Sparks from the railroad 
locomotive would also ignite slash that could burn for days on end. 
Loggers cut every big thing in sight and left slash scattered about for 
miles and miles: a spark's dream landing spot.4 In the early 1900s, 
forest fires burned an average of over 40 million acres each year, and in 
every year up to 1930, at least 20 million acres burned.5 The first go-
3 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
4 McQuillan, Alan. 11 November 1991. Personal Interview. Forestry Professor, 
University of Montana, Missoula, Montana. 
^ MacCleery, Douglas. 1973. The Graphic Facts about the Conditions and Trends of US 
Forests. (Washington, DC: USDA Forest Service) p 20. Since 1950, however, forest fires 
have never burned more than 8 million acres. This gives an idea of how extensive and 
massive these fires were; it also gives an insight into the motivation of the US Forest 
Service employees to become aggressive about fire suppression in the early days of the 
Forest Service. 
round of a massive fire event actually was beneficial as a seed source 
enhancer, but these areas burned again and again, and soon there were 
no seed sources available nearby.6 Because of the lack of seed sources, 
many of these massive cut-over burned-over areas turned into huge 
brush fields comprised mostly of early serai species that were not 
rehabilitated into tree stands until the 1960s.7 
The failing economy of the 1930s slowed the timber harvest to 
the point that the timber companies could no longer afford to maintain 
logging camps. When the demand for timber increased again in the 
1940s, several technological innovations that had developed in the 
meantime led to the change in the nature of logging in Montana. 
Automotive power became more widespread, and particularly, the web 
of roads began to spread farther out from population centers and closer 
to the forests, which made automotive transport cheaper than 
locomotive transport. Railroad hauling then ended in favor of truck 
hauling. Only a big company could buy a railroad, but trucks were 
affordable for many individuals, and afforded many more people access 
to logs. 
LH Harvey, a forester who began working for NPRW in 1944, 
maintains that the pickup truck sounded the death knell of the logging 
camp, because it allowed loggers to get to cutting sites every day 
without having to live on site, and allowed companies to discard the 
6 McQuillan, 11 November 1991. 
7 McQuillan, 11 November 1991. 
expense of building housing and feeding loggers.8 Primitive logging 
trucks began to haul logs in Montana around 1938, and became 
common in the 40s. The trucks had bunks similar to modern tractor-
trailer rigs, but the bunks were affixed on straight, extended wheelbases, 
unlike modern rigs, where the bunks are on a trailer that can be 
detached from the tractor. Consequently, logs were cut to about 32 feet 
(about 10-20 feet shorter than typical current log lengths), in order to fit 
on the trucks.9 
Another important innovation was the gasoline-powered 
chainsaw. First two-person, and by 1940, one-person chainsaw models 
allowed two people to cut many more trees in a day than they could 
with a crosscut saw, thus a small number of sawyers could match the 
daily output of a whole camp of crosscut sawyers. In addition, people 
adapted machinery built for construction and agriculture and began 
using it for logging. In particular, loggers started using Caterpillar 
tractors—designed for earthmoving and pulling agricultural 
implements—to skid logs from where they fell out to roads where the 
logs could be loaded easily on a truck.10 These technological 
developments allowed the development of the "gyppo logger," an 
independent logger who worked on his own or in consort with just a 
few more people in the woods, and who contracted for work with 
timber suppliers or timber buyers for specific sales. 
8 Harvey, LH. 14 November 1991. Telephone Interview. Former NP/BN forester and 
forest manager, Missoula, Montana. 
9 Muechal, Bob. 14 November 1991. Personal Interview. Long Range Planner, Lolo 
National Forest, Missoula, Montana. 
10 Muechal, 14 November 1991. 
When logging scaled back from the huge production of railroad 
logging and large crews of loggers to relatively light equipment 
operated by only a few people, trained foresters realized their chance to 
argue for selective cutting. "Everyone associated the industry with 
massive clearcuts, and clearcuts were destruction" in the minds of 
many Americans.11 As discussed previously, NPRW responded to 
perceived federal and public pressure by implementing gestures of 
conservation in its timberland management. The 1953 NPRW Annual 
Report states that "the management of the Company's timber 
properties is in accordance with sound forestry practices." The 
company also reported in 1953 the establishment of "six certified tree 
farms, totaling 479,975 acres" on cut-over land, and it hired trained, 
professional foresters to manage all of this land.12 Virtually all of these 
foresters hired by NPRW had been trained in the traditional Germanic 
ideals of sustained-yield forestry; their "mission in life was the cutting 
and growing of trees."13 
Prior to World War II, NPRW's basic method of handling its 
Montana forests was "custodial"14; most remained remote and 
unlogged at the end of the war. As returning soldiers cashed in their 
paychecks to build homes, the market value for lumber soared 
sensationally, and the high values led the Land Department to start 
looking seriously at the NPRW timber in Montana. It also realized 
H McQuillan, 11 November 1991. 
Northern Pacific Railway Company 1953 Annual Report, p 14. 
13 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
14 Grove, Byron. 8 November 1991. Personal Interview. Retired NP/BN/PC forester 
and forest manager, Missoula, Montana. 
that "timber was a crop that could be grown and that would be a 
continuing asset for the railroad."15 
First, the NPRW tried to ascertain what it really owned, and 
embarked on an inventory project in 1954 because "they knew they had 
a lot of timber but didn't know too much about it," reasoned Byron 
Grove, who began working for the NP in 1954, and who was hired 
specifically for the inventory project. "Until NP got markets to their 
land or had mills for their timber they didn't have anything to do but 
cruise it and find out what was there and watch over it."16 Earlier 
timber cruisers had gone over some of the NPRW holdings section by 
section, "But a lot of the lands were never cruised, and the cruisers 
only really considered merchantable timber [at the time of the cruise]. 
New merchantability limits had creeped in, new species had become 
acceptable to the public, so the old cruises were obsolete."17 The 
railroad bought a plane and hired SG "Bud" Merryman, a former 
WWII pilot, to be an inventory forester. The NP set up a photography 
lab and began to use aerial photometric methods of inventory over its 
million and a half acres.18 
The NP had sold most of its easily-accessed lands in Montana by 
the 1950s, and what was left was remote and away from the market. 
Large timberland sales to Frederick Weyerhauser and Marcus Daly (of 
the Anaconda Copper Mining Company) around the turn of the 
Merryman, SG. 18 November 1991. Telephone Interview. Former president and CEO 
of BN Timberlands, Whidbey Island, Washington. 
16 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
17 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
century had high-graded the most productive and accessible lowland 
timber lands.19 What remained was dispersed farther up into the 
mountains and was difficult to access.20 In the 1950s, the biggest task 
for NP foresters, such as LH Harvey, Byron Grove, and David 
Whitesitt, was developing access to the timber. Foresters "probably 
devoted more energy to access than to timber management, because we 
had to get there first."21 The lands were in "checkerboard" ownership 
patterns (due to the specifications of the land grant, the railroad could 
only choose odd-numbered sections; the USFS held most of the even 
sections, thus the ownership pattern resembled a checkerboard), and 
neither the USFS nor the railroad had roads in to the majority of the 
lands. The USFS was required by law to grant access to anyone with 
inholdings in the National Forests. However, the cost of building a 
road across at least one square-mile section, without accessing any 
timber on the way, made most roads to inheld sections to expensive to 
build for the amount of harvestable timber the road would access.22 
Both the Forest Service and the NP realized that it was in everyone's 
best interest to share access roads to the timber, rather than creating a 
"Jacob's ladder road system," in which a road would zig and zag back 
and forth within one section to avoid running over adjoining 
landownership.23 In 1962, both parties eventually developed an 
agreement to exchange easements and to enter into a cost-share 
Brady, L James. 20 November 1991. Telephone Interview. Former timber manager and 
VP of Plum Creek, Issaquah, Washington. Weyerhauser only bought land from the 
railroad that had at least 50,000 board feet per acre. 
20 Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
21 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
22 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
23 Muechal, 14 November 1991. 
arrangement in road construction, since their holdings were so 
intermingled.24 
In the mid-1950s, BN executives became increasingly aware of 
the importance of the non-rail holdings of the company. The company 
reorganized on 1 January, 1956, and created a Properties and Industrial 
Development department. Dwight Edgill, a forester, was promoted to 
general manager of Property and Industrial Development in St Paul 
and SG "Bud" Merryman, based in Seattle, became manager of Timber 
and Western Lands. Merryman then began to initiate plans to develop 
the company's timberlands.25 Previously, NPRW had set aside its 
Montana lands in reserve for cross-tie production, but it soon realized 
that it had "a lot more timber than it needed, so the next thing was 
how to get it out, and then we had to find a place to take it to."26 So the 
railroad systematically set out to develop a market for the timber on its 
Montana lands. 
The NPRW was primarily a railroad company, and the people 
who ran the company were railroad people; the timberlands were 
"pretty much the bastard stepchild" of the rolling stock, so when the 
NP set out to develop a market for its timber resources, it set out to 
develop a market with its rolling stock in mind, not necessarily the 
natural resources.27 The railroad tried to induce companies to invest 
large sums of money in mill construction near NP holdings by offering 
24 Muechal, 14 November 1991, and NPRW 1963 Annual Report, p 12. 
25 Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
26 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
27 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
them long-term guarantees of a given amount of timber at fair market 
price. Most of these were ten-year timber commitments, so a mill 
would have the opportunity to amortize the expense of building or 
expanding a mill over the value of the timber they were guaranteed to 
receive. "Fair market price" basically amounted to the amount for 
which the USFS was selling its timber.28 
Several Montana-owned mills, such as Missoula White Pine & 
Sash, and Plum Creek in Pablo, entered into ten-year contracts with the 
railroad for guarantees, respectively, of five million board feet (mmbf) 
annually and 25 mmbf annually, and expanded their operations. 
Yellowstone Pine, a mill in Belgrade, also entered into a supply 
contract with the railroad. Two companies from outside of Montana, 
Vancouver Plywood Company and Evans Products Company, built a 
jointly-operated mill in Missoula that operated under the name of 
Van-Evans Plywood, and did so largely under the impetus of a ten-year 
guarantee of 30 mmbf from the NP. Cascade Plywood Corporation 
bought out a plywood operation in Poison and expanded and 
modernized it, and entered into a ten-year agreement with the railroad 
to assure 30 mmbf annually 29 
The railroad wanted to locate mills that would ship products 
over the NP line so the rolling stock would make more money. The 
railroaders figured they could coax the companies in with good offers 
of timber, but once the mills were located, the mills would have to ship 
28 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
29 Grove, 8 November 1991, and NPRW 1959 Annual Report, p 10. 
all their products on the NP, whether or not the original timber was 
from NP lands. Essentially, the railroad looked on the long-term 
contracts as a way of guaranteeing a certain amount of freight for not 
just the ten years, but for as long as the mills operated. The railroad 
"wasn't looking at growing trees and being in the natural resource 
business perpetually or even for a given time frame. Mostly, they were 
looking at their trees as a method to enhance the rolling stock end of 
the operation."30 
These long-term contracts were all based on stumpage sales. In a 
stumpage sale, the buyer would pay a given price per board foot for a 
standing tree ("on the stump"), then cut the tree himself, or hire 
contractors to cut the tree. During the tenure of the long-term 
contracts, foresters on the ground located the roads and marked the 
timber for cutting, while the mill constructed the roads to the timber 
and contracted its own loggers to remove and haul the trees to the mill. 
The main duties of the foresters were to "put in timber sales, 
essentially on a year-round basis."31 Foresters would locate the sale 
primarily to "cut the timber that needed cutting worst,"32 that is, 
foresters marked those trees that, in the forester's opinion, had reached 
maturity and were near death. There were "no guidelines or manuals 
to follow," foresters "did what their best judgement told them to do."33 
Generally, the objectives of the foresters were to find enough trees to 
fulfill the contracts set up with the mills. 
Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
31 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
32 Whitesitt, David. 7 November 1991. Personal Interview. Former NP/BN/PC 
forester, Seeley Lake, Montana. 
33 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
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During the ten-year period of the stumpage contracts, NP 
foresters relied primarily on partial cuts to meet the contracted harvest 
for the mills. The NP did use clearcuts, though the amount varies in 
the anecdotal data from ten percent to thirty percent of all acres treated. 
Clearcuts were first used by the NP to salvage trees from spruce bark 
beetle epidemics that spread over western Montana in the early 1960s, 
and also for fire salvage sales. They were regularly prescribed after 
that.34 However, the majority of the acres treated by NP management 
activities were seed-tree, shelterwood, or selective cuts: uneven-aged 
management. During this time, the NP relied almost exclusively on 
natural regeneration, so a prime concern for foresters was to assure a 
good seed crop for regeneration: "We didn't do any planting, so we left 
seed trees. I mean, they were good trees. They weren't where you go in 
and take out all the merchantable and leave all the junk out there, and 
say, 'Those are our seed trees.' We left prime, good, seed-bearing, 
valuable trees on site."35 
Even when NP foresters used clearcuts, the cuts were usually 
"contour clearcuts" that were long and narrow. The open ground 
would be about 400 feet wide, and foresters would leave a swath of trees 
at least 200 feet wide between the cut swaths. This would leave an 
exposed seed wall the length of the cut for regeneration. "The benefit 
was that you tended to lie a little lighter on the ground when you were 
trying to get natural regeneration back."36 Foresters generally marked 
34 Harvey, 14 November 1991. 
3® Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
36 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
the trees in the sale, and inspected the loggers as they carried out the 
cut. Erosion control and merchantability standards were the two major 
concerns in site inspections: the NP wanted trees to be eight inches in 
top diameter to cut, and it wanted the loggers to construct erosion 
controls with their Cats.37 
In the 1960s, most NP trees were cut with chainsaws and skidded 
with Cats. The foresters preferred Cat logging, because the Cats would 
scarify the ground for tree reproduction as a by-product of logging.38 
(In general, young trees germinate and grow better in "mineral" soil, or 
exposed dirt, than in an organic layer. Scarifying the soil exposes more 
mineral soil in which seeds can germinate.) If the area of the sale was 
not practical to road, was too steep, or if the soils were fragile, the 
foresters would select a different method, usually cable or shovel 
logging. With the shovel logging, however, roads had to be 
constructed every 250-300 feet because the reach of the cable was only a 
few hundred feet, so they "ended up with a lot more roads than they 
ever needed." Shovel logging was a short-term phenomenon that 
lasted about ten years and was obsolete by the end of the 1960s.39 As 
sales worked up into steeper and steeper ground, however, foresters 
demanded more and more use of cable logging systems.40 
When the long-term contracts in Montana came to an end in 
1969, the company foresters were "sure glad to see them expire."41 NP 
37 Harvey, 14 November 1991, and Grove, 8 November 1991. 
38 Whitesitt, 7 November 1991. 
39 Goetz, 15 November 1991. 
40 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
41 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
cutting policy then changed "from developing markets and setting up 
sales geared to the markets we had developed to harvesting what we 
could grow."42 NP also abandoned stumpage sales in favor of direct log 
sales at this time. Because each mill preferred certain species and sizes, 
a mill would have to re-sell or trade what it had received from the NP 
stumpage contracts if the logs were something it did not prefer. Most 
plywood mills, for example, preferred larch because it peeled easily and 
did not taper much, and thus, given a choice, would buy larch. 
Missoula White Pine Sash wanted only pine for its products, and 
would trade or sell the other species it received from its stumpage 
contract with the NP to other mills. The NP switched to log sales 
because timber sales were worth more if NP sorted the logs itself before 
the logs reached the mill, and because the NP had much more control 
over the way the land was being operated.43 So the railroad then 
contracted loggers to cut, sort and haul the logs. Logs that were sold 
delivered directly to the mill instead of on the stump created more 
work out in the field for foresters, but generated more profit for the 
company.44 
The railroad had concentrated on selling stumpage and logs 
from its lands, but as company leaders began to pay more attention to 
maximizing the results of what could be obtained from timberlands, 
42 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
43 Binger, C Robert. 8 February 1992. Telephone Interview- Former President, BN 
Resources Division, Dellwood, MN. The long-term contracts "tied [NP's] hands," and 
essentially took the control over how to manage the land out of the hands of the 
railroad, according to Binger. The contracts also had no escalation clauses, and Binger 
remembered that in one of the years in the contract "era," NP would have earned $39 
million more on the open timber market for the amount of timber it sold under long-term 
contracts. 
44 Whitesitt, 7 November 1991. 
they set out to purchase a manufacturing outlet for company logs in 
order to obtain more profit from the same amount of wood. Plum 
Creek, a company with mills in Pablo and Columbia Falls, Montana, 
had long been a customer for railroad logs, and the owner, DC 
Dunham, enjoyed a close relationship with NP.45 When Dunham 
died, his widow chose to sell the mills rather than operate them, and, 
because of their amicable relationship, she was favorably disposed to 
sell to the railroad. NP chose to buy the Plum Creek mills in 1968 
because they offered downstream vertical integration in two locations 
close to BN timber holdings in Montana. Lou Menk, who took over as 
president of the NP in 1966, felt there should be some "synergisms" 
between the company's timberlands and the manufacturing process in 
order to optimize the results of the timber properties, and so he 
acquired Plum Creek when the occasion arose.46 NP decided that the 
Plum Creek operations were "ideal" as a controlled marketing outlet 
for NP timberland, and thus entered the wood products manufacturing 
business.47 
Menk hired CR "Bob" Binger, previously the Operational Vice 
President at Boise Cascade, as NP Vice President of Resources in 1968, 
so that the NP would have someone with a resources background to 
handle its increasingly valuable resource holdings. Menk sought 
someone from outside the NP because he judged that no one within 
the NP was "adequate to manage the resource end of the business."48 
45 Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
46 Menk, Lou. 5 December 1991. Telephone Interview- Former NP and BN president, 
CEO, and chairman, Carefree, Arizona. 
47 Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
48 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
Binger's first day on the job coincided with the day NP took over 
operations of Plum Creek (1 January, 1968) much to the relief of the 
railroad management, because they did not have "anyone who knew 
anything about sawmills or plywood plants."49 
At virtually the same time that the ten-year stumpage contracts 
expired and Binger began working for the railroad, the NPRW merged 
with the GN, CB&Q, and the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway to 
become Burlington Northern, Inc. (BN) on 2 March, 1970. The 
railroads had filed a petition to merge with the ICC in 1961, but in 1966 
the ICC rejected the merger, saying that the benefits of merger were 
outweighed by the values of competition. The railroads petitioned for 
reconsideration on 27 July, 1966, and the ICC approved the merger on 
19 April, 1968. The railroads then prepared themselves for a 10 May, 
1968, merger.50 However, the Justice Department opposed the merger 
and asked the Supreme Court to issue a blockage pending hearing the 
arguments before the court, which it did. On 2 February, 1970, the 
Burger Court voted 7-0 in favor of the merger, and consolidation 
became official.51 
The formation of BN left Bob Binger as vice president of 
resources (now called BN Resources). In 1973, Bob Downing, who had 
been president of the BN since 1971 (see later discussion for company 
hierarchy), was promoted to Vice-Chairman, and BN created two 
49 Binger, C Robert. 26 November, 1991. Personal Interview. Former President, BN 
Resources Division, Dellwood, MN. 
5° Loving, Rush, Jr. 1972. "A Railroad Merger that Worked," Fortune, August: 132. 
51 Hofsommer, 1 May 1989. 
presidents—one president in charge of transportation and one 
president in charge of resources. Binger then became the president of 
BN resources.52 In this role, Binger was in charge of all real estate, oil 
and gas, coal, timber, agriculture, and all other non-transportation 
assets of the BN, and he guided BN's policy and attitude towards its 
resources until he retired in 1981.53 
Binger, who now manages several farms in Goodhue County, 
Minnesota, graduated first from the University of Minnesota, and then 
from the Yale School of Forestry in 1941. After a military stint in WW 
II, he worked for Potlatch in Idaho for a short time, but returned to 
Minnesota in 1945 to work for the Minnesota & Ontario Paper 
Company. Other than another military commitment in the Korean 
war, Binger was with this company until 1968. He eventually rose 
through the ranks to the position of operational vice-president of the 
Boise Cascade, which bought out Minnesota & Ontario Paper. He 
worked throughout the company's operations, and "knew almost 
everybody in the company." Binger was doing the things that he loved 
to do, but did not feel as challenged as he thought he should have been 
by his job, so when a headhunter from the NPRW came calling, he 
accepted the new challenge 54 
The BN board gave Binger free rein to manage the resources as 
he saw fit, and backed him "one hundred percent" in anything he 
52 Downing, Bob. 4 December 1991. Telephone Interview. Former BN president, vice-
chairman, and director, Spokane, Washington. 
53 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
54 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
wanted to do.55 Lou Menk felt that Binger was doing an "acceptable" 
job of managing the company's resources, and backed his efforts.56 
Most of the board at this time was composed of Menk's "cronies/'57 
and they lent support to Menk's decisions. The board's support for 
Binger and his land management policies was merely an extension of 
its support for Menk; "support was directed to Menk and not to Binger 
specifically."58 In some months, resource income was higher than the 
railroad division's income, and resource profitability was higher than it 
had ever been, so the board "did not want to try to fix something that 
wasn't broken," and Menk and the directors let Binger manage as he 
wished.59 
Until Lou Menk retired, the BN policy, as carried out by Binger, 
was "always to manage the timber on a sustained-yield basis, and to 
always sell the timber at competitive prices."60 Not all of the directors 
followed Menk's lead, however. Director Norton Simon, a well-
known Hollywood art collector and publisher, "wanted to see all the 
resources liquidated to compensate the stockholders with the increased 
earnings,"61 but Binger had a different idea about resource 
management, and a majority of the board backed him. Interestingly, 
Simon's path to the BN board began when he acquired Ohio Match in 
the early 1950s and tried to get a long-term stumpage contract with 
NPRW, but the railroad refused to give him a contract. Simon then 
55 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
56 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
57 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
58 Downing, 4 December 1991. 
59 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
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bought ten per cent of the NP stock and forced himself on the board, 
and it was he who recruited Menk to the NP presidency.62 When 
Menk eventually took over the BN in 1971, Simon pushed him to 
manage the company's resources more aggressively,63 but Menk 
remained satisfied with Binger's methods. 
Binger felt that it was his obligation to the shareholders to 
manage the land "to insure, over the long term, continuous flow of 
income from these resources." His farming and forestry background 
had combined to instill a strong conservation ethic in him: 
I was governed not so much by careful economic 
evaluation but by what I thought was right to do, and then 
try to evaluate the consequences of that in terms of cost. I 
never saw that we were incurring expenses that were 
prohibitive, that we weren't competitive. I don't think we 
were ever uneconomical. It may not have been the 
cheapest way, but it was the responsible way. I think you 
have to pay the cost to do what has to be done right in 
managing lands.64 
This resulted in BN taking a much wider view of the values of its 
timber lands, and these lands were "managed on a sustained-yield basis 
under long-range plans that require balanced planting and harvesting. 
Water resources, fish and wildlife, soil conservation, scenic and 
recreation values are also carefully considered in BN's forest 
management planning."65 
^2 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
63 Downing, 4 December 1991. The volatile dissident Simon was, according to Menk, "a 
large pain in the ass," and "a real rock in the shoe." He soon resigned from the board 
when he discovered that Menk did not plan to renew his directorship. See, generally, 
Rush Loving, Jr's article in the August, 1972, Fortune for a summary of Norton Simon's 
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Binger's forestry training and background led him to take an 
active role in development of BN timber management policy. Binger 
"very definitely had ideas about what he wanted done. Through him 
we developed comprehensive management plans, detailed budgets, 
and environmental impact studies; all were initiated under his 
reign."66 Binger was "very particular about reforestation; he didn't 
want a tree cut until we had a plan for what we were going to do with 
the land. He wanted us to know what we were doing, know what we 
were going to do, and have a plan for reforestation of every sale."67 By 
this time, the railroad had developed markets, so, "We could have 
sold a lot more than we did, but unless we could prove that we could 
grow more, we couldn't cut more."68 
Before Binger took over BN resources, "all the decisions were 
made in St Paul."69 Ed Stanton, Binger's predecessor, was an old 
railroader with only scant interest in natural resource management, so 
he relegated most of the day-to-day management of the resources to his 
assistant, George Powe. Powe, a geologist, "kind of orchestrated 
everything that went on out in the field, though he didn't really know 
much about it."70 Foresters in the field, including head forester Bud 
Merryman, were not allowed to make independent decisions. Mason 
Bruce & Girard, a timber consulting firm in Portland, had to approve 
all timber sales. "That's how much confidence the railroaders had in 
66 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
67 Whitesitt, 7 November 1991. 
68 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
69 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
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their people."71 When Binger arrived, he requested the decision­
making authority to "sell timber at the right prices, in the right places, 
and at the right volumes without an expensive consultant over [his] 
shoulder double checking," so the board canceled the consultant 
contract.72 This allowed Binger to disseminate decisions down to the 
field level: "Binger changed management structure from a direct 
autocratic type of management to a more hierarchical structure," that 
allowed management to delegate authority down to the field units, and 
this expanded the foresters' flexibility and ability to get the job done73: 
Binger recognized that many decisions made by foresters were site-
specific and often needed to be made on the spot: "Where a guy in St 
Paul might take six months to make a decision, a guy on the ground 
can alter things in two minutes if something comes up."74 Within the 
parameters of the annual budget, foresters had the freedom to make 
decisions as they saw fit without being second-guessed.75 
Binger invited the Montana Fish & Game Department to review 
planned timber sales on BN land for possible affects on wildlife, and to 
solicit recommendations to mitigation or enhancement of habitat. At 
first the Fish & Game was suspicious of BN's motives, but soon the 
Department budgeted personnel to go out and inspect every timber sale 
and make suggestions about what NP could do for the fish, deer and 
other wildlife.76 Fish & Game eventually made written 
71 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
72 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
74 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
75 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
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recommendations for each sale that, although non-binding, Binger 
expected each forester to follow within reason. BN left "quite a few" 
wildlife corridors as a result of this consultation, and "even stayed out 
of some areas."77 BN was "the only company that ever did that, in fact 
other industrial companies said no way would they ever bring Fish & 
Game in to view any of their programs."78 BN also hired a wildlife 
biologist, Loren Hicks (who is still employed as a wildlife biologist for 
Plum Creek), so that it could address wildlife concerns more 
thoroughly from within the company, and this also lent credibility to 
BN's concern for wildlife in its timber land management79 
At this time, the BN Timber Department, headed by Bud 
Merryman, was a separate entity from the BN Lands Department. 
Timber's main function was accounting, administration, and 
management of the timberlands, while Lands handled rights-of-way, 
special leases, recreation sites, and land sales.80 When the 
environmental movement started to gather steam, Binger decided to 
begin writing environmental impact statements (EIS) for company 
projects, "to get the jump on everybody."81 Lands then set up 
guidelines to compile EISs for the foresters to follow. Timber 
management employees out on the ground then wrote an EIS for 
"every road they built, every timber sale, and things like this,"82 and 
submitted these to Lands for review. The Land section "had no budget 
77 Whitesitt, 7 November 1991. 
78 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
79 Binger, 8 February 1992. 
80 Brady, 20 November 1991. 
81 Brady, 20 November 1991. 
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constraints, no volume removal goals, no dollars to deal with. Timber 
had volume requirements and dollar requirements to meet budgets. 
But if the impact report didn't satisfy Lands, [Timber] had to make 
whatever methods necessary to adjust them so they would pass."83 "If 
[foresters] didn't measure up to the Land Department's standards, then 
they couldn't put the sale up."84 
There was not only pre-sale review, but also post-sale 
monitoring to measure compliance. People from Lands would select 
several sales for extensive review twice each year. They would go out 
and take pictures and write reports on EIS compliance on the timber 
sale. Lands then forwarded these reports back to Binger in St Paul. 
Binger would review the compliance reports and send comments back 
to the Timber department, and foresters and administration there had 
to answer his comments.85 This was all a part of Binger's efforts to 
make the company more sensitive to the consequences of its actions.86 
At this time, BN harvest levels were determined by predicting 
the growth capabilities of each management unit, then adding all the 
management unit totals together to get a harvest level.87 They would 
find an average amount of board footage from growth predictions to 
come up with a cut figure. Then the company looked at the average 
value per thousand board feet of each species it had scheduled to 
harvest from its management plan to determine its budget. Foresters 
83 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
84 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
85 Brady, 20 November 1991. 
86 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
87 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
would then try to meet both the harvest level and the budget level. 
Three factors determined harvest volumes: "market forces, natural 
occurrences, and [BN's] policy of keeping logging and reforestation in 
balance."88 The management plans were the foundation for the 
harvest plans, and when foresters applied values to the amounts, they 
could project income levels. 89 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the timber industry in the Northwest as a 
whole relied increasingly on clearcuts to get trees to the mills. The 
USFS had clearcut extensively in the 1960s, and most industrial forest 
companies followed suit, but BN, under Binger, followed slowly. The 
USFS had determined that regeneration was, in general, unsatisfactory 
in partial harvesting cuts. Shade tolerant species were left on site, 
generally because they were less merchantable (species such as grand 
fir, spruce, and subalpine fir), and Douglas fir and Ponderosa pine, both 
shade intolerant species, would not regenerate under the canopy. 
Regeneration was determined to be unsatisfactory because Douglas fir 
and Ponderosa pine are generally more desired species than the 
tolerants. With partial harvesting, standing trees were often "barked 
up," or damaged, by skidders or falling trees, and this often led to 
partial rotting, disease, and death. The USFS found this to be a major 
drawback of partial harvesting as well. Logging mechanics were also an 
important factor in the USFS decision to rely on clearcutting. It was 
easier for loggers to cut and slash and burn everything from ridge to 
ridge, "sort of mimicking a natural fire," than make partial cuts. 
88 BN 1976 Annual Report, p 17. 
89 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
Primarily, however, the Forest Service thought "it was easier and 
cheaper to treat a large area at one time, mostly in cost of removal—the 
short-term cost, not the long-term cost."90 
BN clearcut about the same amount of land in the 70s as it had 
in the 60s, but it was cutting from much steeper ground.91 As logging 
got into steeper ground, it became more expensive to build roads, so 
BN began to use more cable-yarding systems. Even though cable-
yarding systems are more expensive than skidders, the cost of road-
building on rough and steep terrain more than offsets its use. With 
cable logging, however, scarification costs for regeneration increase 
because there are no skidders to scarify incidentally.92 BN foresters of 
the time were skeptical about USFS assertions that clearcuts were more 
economical, due partially to the "small stems" one had to handle, and 
variety of species composition one was dealing with. Mostly, however, 
BN foresters felt clearcutting ignored the merchantability of the trees, 
and this made up the difference in cost of harvest.93 
As soon as NP's ten-year contracts in Montana had expired, it 
began to contract with loggers and haulers so foresters could have more 
control of who was doing the work on its lands. If one particular logger 
did not live up to the forester's satisfaction, the forester did not have to 
hire that logger again. Foresters put logging jobs out on bid, "but didn't 
let just anybody bid," rather the foresters invited bids from loggers 
90 Muechal, 14 November 1991. 
91 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
92 Whitesitt, 7 November 1991. 
93 Harvey, 14 November 1991, and Grove, 8 November 1991. 
whom they felt could do a good job in the woods. Contracts were quite 
specific on how the railroad wanted the unit logged, and loggers had to 
follow the contracts quite closely if they hoped to work on railroad land 
again.94 This practice continued under BN ownership as well. 
Under Binger's leadership in the 1970s, the BN gradually cut its 
lands on a sustained-yield basis and constructed enough roads to access 
almost all of its timber.95 Binger escalated BN's road-building activity 
in the 70s as fast as possible because it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to construct roads "due to environmental people getting more 
concerned about that, and justifiably so. But you can't manage timber if 
you don't have roads."96 From 1973 to 1978, BN built 870 miles of 
main access roads to allow "more intensified management" of its 
timberlands.97 Once the roads were in place, BN could "get in and take 
small volumes wherever mortality happened to occur," because the 
timber program mostly amounted to "salvaging mortality."98 BN was 
using its old growth stands to "carry it along to the period when the 
second growth would come in so there wouldn't be a hiatus in the 
volume of production."99 
A key component of BN's management objectives for its timber 
holdings under Binger was the processing plants that it purchased or 
built. By converting its own trees in its own mills, BN was able to 
94 Whitesitt, 7 November 1991. 
95 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
96 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
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virtually double the amount it realized from the stumpage on its 
land.100 In addition, BN could utilize the entire tree by processing in 
its own mills, and thus make money from every part of every tree; BN 
could cut boards, convert peeler logs to plywood, small logs to studs, 
burn any bark and wastings in a bark-burning boiler to generate steam 
and electricity, process sawdust into medium-density fiberboard, and 
sell chips to the Frenchtown pulp mill.101 
In the woods, a computer management model called Timber 
RAM guided the foresters' harvest in the early 80s. Computer models 
such as this help managers optimize uses of forestlands, and many 
private companies and public agencies used Timber RAM in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Managers entered data based on acres, productivity 
and age-class distribution, and the computer model offered managers a 
range of possibilities and consequences for harvest plans based on the 
Present Net Value (PNV). The purpose of the computer model was to 
help bring all the BN land into a managed state; therefore, one 
constraint on the system was "the harvest of all the older, more 
decadent stands to get them into a younger forest."102 As a forecasting 
100 Binger, 8 February 1992. 
101 Binger, 8 February 1992. Binger attempted to close the loop from raw material to 
finished product within the company whenever possible. BN sold its sawdust to the LP 
fiberboard mill in Missoula. Because LP was the only outlet for BN's sawdust, Binger 
thought that LP was able to manipulate the price levels too much, so BN built its own 
medium-density fiberboard plant to create its own outlet and maximize the returns on 
its sawdust. BN also entered into negotiations to buy the Frenchtown mill from Hoener 
Waldorf, but never reached an agreement; so the chip market was one production loop 
that BN did not close. BN also bought a mill in Ksanka, and a plywood plant and stud 
mill in Kalispell. 
102 Johnson, Gary. 20 November 1991. Telephone Interview. Forester, Plum Creek 
Timber Company, Enumclaw, Washington. 
device, Timber RAM "was good to the extent that the economic and 
growth forecasts fed into it were good."103 
BN fluctuated the harvest levels from time to time to take 
advantage of opportunities in the marketplace. When the market was 
favorable, foresters increased the cut, and when market conditions 
were unfavorable, they harvested fewer trees.104 BN never shut down 
its operations, "even in bad times," in order to "maintain the quality of 
employees and maintain the continuity of operations."105 Binger felt 
that BN could get and keep the best available employees if it treated 
them well and assured them of work even when the market was 
down. 
Community stability is one of the guiding tenets of the 
traditional Germanic-type foresters in this country,106 and Binger 
believed strongly that it was in the best interests of BN to assure 
community stability in the areas in which it had operations. Not only 
did he keep people employed in slack times, but while he was in charge 
of resources, Plum Creek banked in the town of Kalispell. When BN 
took over Plum Creek, Binger met with bankers in Kalispell and 
assured them that Plum Creek would continue to bank in Kalispell as 
long as the banks were competitive with banks around the country, 
and as long as the Kalispell banks "accommodated the local needs of 
103 Sigars, Denny. 3 December 1991. Personal Interview. Missoula District manager, 
Plum Creek Timber Company, Missoula, Montana. 
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Of Sustained-Yield Policy On The National Forests," Journal of Forestry, 81(3):153. 
the community — to loan local people the money they needed to get a 
refrigerator and laundry machines/' rather than invest the money out 
of the area.107 Binger felt BN had a responsibility to sustain the health 
of the communities in which its employees lived. 
One reason Plum Creek was able to maintain separate banking 
records was that Binger ran all of the various operations in the 
resource division as separate profit centers. When Binger began with 
the NP in 1968, he maintained separate management on the new Plum 
Creek acquisition, so timberland management was separated from the 
wood manufacturing management. His experience in the wood-
products industry allowed him to recognize how larger wood-products 
companies that also owned timberlands, such as Weyerhauser and 
Boise Cascade, "made their balance sheets and reports to their 
shareholders look better by putting their own timber through their 
mills and charging it as if it was at the going market rate. You never 
knew if the mills were efficient or whether they weren't. They were all 
showing a profit because they got timber for nothing."108 
If Plum Creek wanted to buy timber from BN, it had to pay the 
appraised value of the timber or go someplace else to buy its timber.109 
If Plum Creek could buy timber more cheaply from other suppliers, 
such as sales from the Forest Service, then it did. In 1974, for example, 
Plum Creek obtained only 28 per cent of its logs from BN lands.110 BN 
10? Binger, 26 November 1991. This was also a very effective local public relations 
move. 
I08 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
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foresters, meanwhile, were free to sell BN timber to the highest bidder 
on the open market.111 Binger felt that this forced each operation to 
become more efficient, and provided "incentive and inducement for 
the people in the different divisions to really compete very hard to 
show the results for their own operations."112 
Binger's timber management program proceeded on a sustained-
yield basis through the 1970s with no dramatic changes, but both Binger 
and Menk, the two people most responsible for setting BN's timber 
management policy, were approaching retirement by the end of the 
decade. Lou Menk, the Chairman and CEO of BN, was the controlling 
influence in the company.113 The BN board followed his lead in the 
decision-making process.114 Menk thought the BN had an "excellent" 
board: "They knew what we were doing. We kept them well-
informed.... They set policy and we abided by the policy. Boards of 
Directors should not be directing individual officers to do anything."115 
Binger, by contrast, considered the board lazy and ineffective: "They 
were all cronies of the chairman. They never asked any intelligent 
questions. They came to meetings not informed, not prepared, not 
understanding the information they got between meetings to read."116 
Menk had assembled a cast of directors who he felt "were the best we 
could get in all fields....We just tried to get people who had broad 
111 Grove, 8 November 1991. 
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113 Downing, 4 December 1991. 
114 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
115 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
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experiences in their business."117 This cast became very accustomed to 
following Menk's lead. 
When he reached the age of 60 in 1978, Menk "retired at [his] 
own request as CEO/' though he stayed on as chairman.118 Bob 
Downing had retired in 1976, and Norman Lorentson, Menk's 
replacement as CEO, was also approaching retirement.119 As Menk 
considered a replacement for both Lorentson and himself, he did not 
find what he was looking for among the ranks of railroad personnel: 
"We had good railroad people, but I thought that we could use 
somebody that had another perspective. We decided we needed a 
generalist."120 The generalist who Menk decided to hire was Dick 
Bressler, an executive vice-president with Atlantic Richfield (ARCO)-
Bressler was "primarily a brilliant financial guy" with an objective 
perspective of the business.121 Menk knew Bressler and was impressed 
with his financial skills, and "when his name came up in the search 
firm's dossier, [Menk] got ahold of him, told him what [BN] was after, 
and he accepted the job".122 
With his experience at ARCO, Bressler was familiar with the oil 
and gas business. The Arab oil embargo and OPEC constraints on the 
world oil supply in the 1970s made people at the BN aware that the 
117 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
118 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
Downing, 4 December 1991. 
120 Menk, 5 December 1991. As Binger put it, "We needed a businessman, not an 
operator.... Someone who could take a fresh look and run the company as a business, 
rather than follow procedures that had been established 75 years before." 
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company's oil and gas holdings "seemed to be the place where you 
could make the most money the fastest. It was generally regarded that 
the timber was not as important in the long run for profits as the oil 
and gas."123 The BN realized that it "had to work hard in oil and gas," 
but its resource president, Bob Binger, "didn't have those kinds of 
talents. He was strong in the timber end. He wasn't very good—he 
wasn't good at all—in the oil end of the business."124 "To some extent, 
Bob was a victim of the fact that his experience in oil and gas was no 
different than the railroad people's. He did not have an oil and gas 
background."125 As oil became more important to the profit scheme, 
BN wanted to make sure that it had someone in charge who could 
capitalize on the company's petroleum opportunities, and Bressler was 
Menk's choice to do so. 
When he retired, Menk felt that he "had the railroad part in 
pretty good shape," but that resource development was lacking.126 
Binger, meanwhile, thought that resource development was right on 
line, but that the railroad was very inefficient.127 Bressler would later 
come and squeeze more money out of both the resources and the 
railroad with a more aggressive management style. 
Before Bressler arrived, BN was sluggish in both profits and 
management style, and the change in management heightened the 
123 Downing, 4 December 1991. 
124 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
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responsiveness of the company.128 The railroad had "a lot of operators 
and not many managers." "Instead of managing the resources and 
assets that the railroad represented — steel and cars and rolling stock, 
etc — BN had a lot of hobbyists. Hobbyists were great operators — they 
knew all the timetables and numbers and tie lengths and things — but 
they didn't know how to manage that resource to make money."129 
This was a big factor in bringing in someone from the outside. 
"Bringing in somebody who didn't know anything about the railroad 
was probably a good thing, because somebody from within the industry 
would have just perpetuated the railroad mindset, while someone 
from the outside should be more objective about it."130 The core of the 
railroad's problem was that about fifty cents of every dollar of income 
went for labor — there were too many employees, and Bressler cut the 
work force substantially when he arrived in an attempt to increase 
efficiency.131 
Menk and the board gave Bressler a seven-year contract to lead 
the BN.132 Binger was opposed to the contract because he felt the 
tendency of someone under a term contract would be to "do whatever 
they have to do with the resources of the company to enhance their 
position and their image and their performance by short-term 
decisions in the company. If you know your contract runs seven years, 
128 Brady, 20 November 1991. 
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131 Binger, 26 November 1991. Binger thought that the railroaders were running the 
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put BN on a profitable track by applying modern business management techniques to run 
the company. 
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you can take seven years and liquidate a lot of things in the company 
and show profitability."133 Bressler replaced the retired Norman 
Lorentson as CEO, while Menk remained chairman. When Lou Menk 
retired one year later, Bressler replaced him as chairman of the board. 
Bressler reported to stockholders that, "In the future, we're going to 
take a much more aggressive approach on costs and we expect to 
measure results in terms of annual improvements in railroad return 
on assets," and that "greater percentage growth will come from our oil 
and gas business and our forest management operations during the 
next five years."134 
When Bressler arrived, Binger informed him that the 
company's natural resources were "all set to respond in a very effective 
way to changes in the economy, regardless of what they are." Binger 
told Bressler that BN resources had a "wonderful organization" and 
"excellent, highly motivated people," whereupon Bressler responded, 
"Why do you think I came here?"135 Binger then realized that Bressler 
intended on "capitalizing on what a lot of outsiders perceived to be a 
lethargic organization that was not really doing what it could with its 
resources": They looked at all this timber and asked, 'Why carry it for 
fifteen or twenty or thirty or forty or fifty years when we can strip it all 
off and run it into the export market and pocket all that money?"'136 
Binger, who had managed timber for perpetual flow, felt that Bressler 
was an "opportunist," and that it was an "injustice," and "irresponsible 
133 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
134 BN 1980 Annual Report, p 1. 
135 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
13^ Binger, 26 November 1991. 
for management to make decisions based on short-term gain, 
particularly with natural resources."137 
Bob Binger retired from BN in January of 1981 when the 
company made personnel adjustments to accomodate the appointment 
of Dick Bressler as president and CEO- Binger, the president of 
resources, was then 63 and ready to retire, as was Norman Lorentson, 
so the positions of president of resources and president of 
transportation were consolidated into one the single president position 
that Bressler assumed. Binger remained on the payroll as an honorary 
"consultant" for one year until his "official" retirement in 1982.138 
Thus Binger, who had shepherded resources so conservatively in order 
to maintain them for the future, turned over the management of the 
timberlands of the company to Dick Bressler, whose philosophy was to 
"cut the trees down and sell them as fast as he could."139 For the 
foresters in the field, "There was much more emphasis on good 
forestry, good management, and good land practices under Binger. 
Then after he left, why the emphasis swung pretty strongly the other 
way. Economics was the big question."140 
Bressler's "first priority" was to "increase productivity and get a 
firm grip on costs."141 To accomplish these priorities, Bressler first 
restructured the BN into a holding company in order to split the 
company into seven different profit centers: railroad, forest products, 
137 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
138 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
139 Brady, 20 November 1991. 
140 Whitesitt, 7 November 1991. 
141 BN 1980 Annual Report, p 1. 
manufactured products, energy, air freight, forwarding, trucking, and 
land & real estate. On 26 January, 1981, BN's board voted to form the 
holding company, to be called Burlington Northern, Inc, and when the 
BN shareholders overwhelmingly approved the holding company on 
15 May, 1981, it became official. Each BN company was left to make or 
lose money on its own without benefit of income from the other 
divisions. One of the factors in the decision to split the company and 
to place it under one big holding company was that government 
regulations at the time prohibited a railroad from hauling its own coal 
for other than internal consumption purposes.142 Separate mining 
and transportation entities circumvented government regulations and 
allowed BN to mine its extensive coal holdings in the Fort Union coal 
seam in Montana and Wyoming.143 For a railroad company like BN, 
the holding company organization liberated the non-rail divisions 
from the regulatory grip of the ICC, a grip that the railroad had found 
constrictive in the past.144 
Lou Menk had always planned to form a holding company for 
the BN, as railroads such as the Penn Central had done. Menk felt that 
the BN needed to be free of the regulatory restraints that it faced in 
managing its various resources, and a holding company arrangement 
would allow the BN "to operate the separate businesses as separate 
businesses."145 First, however, he wanted to take care of the BN 
merger with the St Louis-San Francisco Railway Company (the 
142 Shirley, Steve. 1982. Missoulian, 14 March, p 32. 
143 Missoulian 28 January 1981, p 22, and 15 May 1982, p 2. 
144 Taylor, Annette. 1982. Missoulian, 21 February, p 9. 
145 Menk, 5 December 1991. 
"Frisco")/ which eventually became effective on 21 November, 1980. 
The "penancy of the acquisition of the Frisco" delayed corporate 
restructuring. However, once the Frisco was "in the fold," BN, with 
Bressler at the helm, moved ahead with the holding company.146 
Congress made this holding company arrangement easier in 
1980 when it passed the Staggers Rail Act. The primary purpose of the 
act was to relax the controls of the ICC and allow railroads to set rates 
according to the market, not according to ICC regulation. Before the act 
passed, the ICC had regulatory control over prices, rail maintenance 
and sales of railroad-owned companies, but the act essentially 
deregulated railroad industry economics. This deregulatory move also 
allowed railroad companies to form non-rail entities to exploit their 
timber and fossil fuel resources more readily. The non-rail entities, 
because they had nothing to do with transportation, operated outside of 
the realm of the remaining, relaxed ICC controls.147 Bressler felt that 
the Staggers Act improved BN's prospects of managing the business "in 
the real world of free market enterprise."148 
As the company under the umbrella of the holding company 
that would be in charge of timberland management, BN Timberlands 
146 Menk, 5 December 1991. According to Binger, since the time of the merger in 1971, 
BN had hired lawyers and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars trying to figure out a 
way to form a holding company. After several years the lawyers determined that it 
could not be done, and Menk then did not do anyting to pursue the concept any further. 
Bressler, however, found a way to form the holding company almost immediately. 
147 Porterfield, Andrew 1989- "Railroaded: The LBO trend on Wall Street is playing 
havoc with the nation's forests," Common Cause, Sept-Oct: 22. The Act was named 
after the late Harley Staggers, a Democratic representative from West Virginia and a 
long-time railroad booster. 
148 BN 1980 Annual Report, p 1. 
was formed "to make the operation more flexible and responsive to 
market conditions," and to simplify corporate structure. The holding 
company transferred management of the 1.5 million acres of railroad 
timberlands and all forest products to BN Timberlands.149 SG "Bud" 
Merryman, formerly Vice-President in charge of timber and lands at 
BN, was made President and CEO of the company. Merryman also 
remained a Vice-President of Burlington Northern, Inc, to satisfy terms 
of a long-term mortgage placed on the lands and properties of the 
NPRW in 1897 by JP Morgan, which stipulated that all profits from the 
lands had to be returned to the operation of the railroad. Merryman's 
presence as an officer of both companies was designed to bridge the gap 
between the criteria of the lien and the new corporate structure in 
1981.150 
Deregulation through the Staggers Act threw the BN into a 
corporate environment fraught with the leveraged buy-outs (LBO), 
junk bonds, and unfriendly takeovers that marked the beginning of the 
Reagan-Bush administration. BN Timberlands, with a lot of standing 
assets, then had to be concerned about looking for a quick way to avoid 
a hostile takeover.151 Takeover artists make their money through 
financing takeovers by offering high-interest bonds to gather 
speculation capital, then use the money to buy majority interests in 
companies with undervalued assets, liquidate the assets, pay off the 
149 Missoulian, 1 July 1991, p 9. 
150 Merryman, 18 November 1991. According to Bob Binger, second-growth timber, 
because it was not on the land at the time of the bond, was exempt from the terms of the 
bond. In everyday working terms, the bond conditions were mostly a formality. BN 
reported the earnings of the lands to the trustees, who then made these earnings 
available to the company, minus interest due on the bonds. 
!51 Porterfield, p 22. 
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bonds, and walk away with the profit. BN Timberlands, which had 
been tied in safety to the railroad and its massive size for so long, 
suddenly thought it had to try to make itself an elusive takeover target, 
by quickly decreasing its standing assets, that is, by accelerating the 
cutting of its trees: 
Economics pushed us, starting with the Booth Kelly land 
sales in Oregon where somebody moved in and bought up 
a timber holding and liquidated it off and pocketed the 
difference, which was many millions of dollars. It then 
became pretty apparent that BN had to accelerate its cut a 
little bit in order to not be sitting on top of a pile full of 
uncut merchantable timber. It was like having money in 
the bank with no interest. We had to be responsive to the 
economic demand or somebody would come in there and 
take over the timber holdings, or they would sell it off and 
then they would go in and liquidate it anyway. The 
company had certain things that they did in order to form 
bitter pills and all of that kind of stuff to prevent 
takeovers because we still owned a lot of timberland assets 
at that point in time that would have been sold off or 
liquidated a lot faster, which would have devastated any 
kind of long-term interest at all. So it wasn't a desire to 
continue harvesting timber that caused the acceleration in 
the timber cutting. I think it was economic pressures. 
Either you increase the revenues or you lose the 
opportunity to work on the land.152 
Scarcely two years after the formation of the holding company, 
BN merged BN Timberlands with Plum Creek, Inc, and called the 
weightier amalgamation Plum Creek Timber Company, with 
headquarters in Seattle. Plum Creek, Inc owned eight sawmills or 
wood-products plants in Montana: a sawmill, plywood plant, and 
medium-density fiberboard plant in Columbia Falls, a stud mill at 
Belgrade, a stud mill, sawmill, and plywood plant at Evergreen, a 
152 Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
sawmill at Pablo, and a sawmill at Fortine. Plum Creek, Inc also owned 
ten more industrial operations in the other Northwestern states. 
Bressler installed as the new president David Leland, formerly the vice 
president of the Building Products Group for Southwest Forest 
Industries. 
BN Timberlands and Plum Creek, Inc, arguably a natural 
merger, did not join together with the formation of the holding 
company out of deference to Bud Merryman and Fred Winegar, their 
respective presidents. "Somebody had to be the boss, and Bud wouldn't 
work for Winegar and Winegar wouldn't work for Bud," commented 
Jim Brady. Keeping the two companies separate was a means to 
"protect" the two so the company would not have to fire one or the 
other.153 Merryman eventually left the company "a little early" in 
April of 1983 over a dispute with Bressler about marketing logs to 
China: 
Bressler wanted to sell logs to the Chinese and I 
don't think he gave a damn about the price because he 
wanted to make some inroads with them. He wanted to 
have a deal going with the Chinese because he visited 
there a couple of times. He wanted to say, "Hey, we made 
a deal." Bud [Merryman] said, "We'll see, but we have to 
negotiate first." Bud didn't want to sell logs to the 
Chinese for cheap. Bressler didn't like the speed, so he 
made up his mind that Bud had to go.154 
Since Fred Winegar had retired and had been replaced by William 
Black in 1982, Merryman's retirement cleared the way for Bressler to 
Brady, 20 November 1991. 
^ Brady, 20 November 1991. 
bring on Leland to assume control and to merge Plum Creek and BN 
Timberlands.155 
Leland assured the Montana press that there was "far more 
probability" that the merger would lead to an increase, rather than 
decrease, in the size of BN's forest operations in Montana.156 
Whatever the probability, the reality registered harvest levels on BN 
land in Montana that jumped from 67mmbf in 1982 to 136 mmbf in 
1983 (See Figure 2).157 
NP/BN/Plum Creek timber harvests in the state of Montana 
had remained fairly stable through the 1960s and 1970s, but in 1982, 
under the new corporate structure, the harvest level essentially 
doubled from the previous year; the Plum Creek cut in Montana 
eventually grew by another 100 mmbf in three years until it reached 
236 mmbf in 1986.158 From a corporate perspective, Plum Creek found 
itself sitting on high-risk, low-yield capital, so it instigated an 
accelerated old-growth liquidation program.159 Peter Heide, a Plum 
Creek timberlands superintendent in Roslyn, Washington, told the 
New York Times that it was a market-driven decision: Market forces 
and the threat of takeover "wouldn't let [Plum Creek] do otherwise. If 
Brady, 20 November 1991. 
156 Missoulian, 15 July 1983, p 11,17 July 1983, p 14. 
157 parson, Bill. 1988. Letter to Dick Manning. Manning was a reporter for the 
Missoulian at the time and writing a series of articles about the rate of harvest of 
timber in Montana and possible consequences thereof. He requested Plum Creek's 
harvest data in the state of Montana, and Parson, the Plum Creek director of timber 
operations in the Rocky Mountains, gave harvest figures from 1978-1987 to Manning in a 
letter in October, 1988. Manning later included these experiences in his nonfiction work, 
Last Stand (Gibbs Smith, 1991). 
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This graph depicts the annual harvest (in millions of board feet) of BN 
and Plum Creek in Montana. The harvest hovered around 70 to 80 
mmbf until 1982, when the cut began to escalate rapidly. Source: BN 
Annual Reports, Bill Parson letter to Dick Manning, October, 1988. 
you keep a lot of this timber on the books, you're undervalued and you 
become an easy takeover target."160 Plum Creek determined that it was 
in its "best interests to harvest the timber as quickly as [it] could get into 
it and sell it," at least until it got out of the old-growth backlog.161 "So 
the problem wasn't one of forest management; the problem was one of 
economic management that caused the company to increase its rate of 
cutting."162 
Plum Creek was trying to get as much profit as it could out of its 
trees as fast as it could—maximizing returns on assets—to keep stock 
prices high in order to ward off leveraged buyouts.163 In 1985, Charles 
Hurwitz, a mutual bond trader from Houston, engineered a hostile 
takeover of Pacific Lumber, a small company that held the largest 
remaining private stand of redwoods in California. After the junk 
bond-financed takeover, Hurwitz promptly set out to liquidate assets of 
the company, and the redwoods began to fall.164 This takeover alerted 
the timber industry that the hostile takeover threat was real and 
intensifying. T Boone Pickens, a buyout specialist, did pick up 2.4% of 
BN in 1986, and BN worried for a little while, but Pickens sold off most 
of his shares shortly thereafter without attempting a takeover.165 
160 Egan, Timothy. 1990. New York Times, 15 February, p A16. 
161 Manning, Dick. 1988. Missoulian, 16 October, p Bl. 
162 Merryman, 18 November 1991. 
163 Crooker, David. 1991. Telephone Interview. 19 November. Manager of Strategic 
Operations, Plum Creek Timber Company, Seattle, Washington. 
164 Pelline, Jeff. 1989. "Pac Lumber Chief Reaping Rewards," San Francisco Chronicle, 
30 November. 
165 Miller, Michael W. 1987. "Corporate Giant Fights the Specter of Robber Baron," 
Wall Street Journal, 20 May, p 6. 
From a shareholder's perspective, holding standing timber was 
simply too risky. A wise and prudent investor would cash in an asset 
as valuable and as vulnerable as standing timber as soon as possible in 
order to guarantee return on her investment.166 Old trees do not add 
value quickly as they age because they grow so slowly once they reach 
maturity, and every day that they spend out on the ground is another 
day that they could possibly be infected with some disease or rot or 
insects — or they could burn in a forest fire. "If you had that kind of 
investment in your portfolio, you'd get rid of that and get something 
that was growing," offered Bill Parson, Plum Creek Rocky Mountain 
Division chief in 1988, "That's kind of the way we are managing some 
of our resources out here."167 Along this line of logic, the market told 
Plum Creek to cut its assets then and there and take the money, because 
cash in hand was a lot safer than trees in the woods. 
Bressler's business background was in resources development, 
and the railroad acquired other natural resource holdings, primarily in 
the petroleum industry, until, by 1984, BN, Inc was just as much a 
resources company as it was a transportation company.168 BN, Inc, the 
holding company, had been searching for a way to separate its resource 
holdings from its transportation holdings, largely to raise the value of 
the non-transportation holdings, which were undervalued because 
they were tied to the railroad's $2.9 billion in long-term debt and 
because BN carried the land on its books at its cost, plus value of 
improvements. Because BN received the land via the land grant, the 
166 McQuillan, 11 November 1991. 
167 Manning, Dick. 1988. Missoulian, 16 October, p Bl. 
168 Porterfield, p 22. 
original cost was nothing, so the market value of its lands had to be 
much higher than their book value.169 To complicate matters, JP 
Morgan's long-term liens, the same liens that had required Bud 
Merryman to occupy officer positions in both BN and BN Timberlands, 
had to be shaken off somehow before the resources could spin off from 
the railroad. Morgan had made the terms of the 1897 bonds extremely 
long to reassure nervous investors of the day: one set of bonds carried a 
100-year term, and one carried a 150-year term, so Bressler had his work 
cut out for him.170 
When Bressler assumed control of BN, he immediately set out 
to find a way to break the bond indentures so that BN could expand its 
energy holdings, which many viewed as potentially the most valuable 
of all the BN properties.171 In 1985, Bressler convinced the trustees of XX •' 
the bonds, Citibank and Bankers Trust, to allow BN to secure the land 
with government securities as collateral and untie the lands from 
indenture, but a group of bondholders immediately sued BN for 
attempting to rewrite terms of bond issues, and won. Most people, as 
well as the judge who presided over the case, assumed the 
bondholders' real aim was to wring out more money for their bonds 
than the BN deal would have offered.172 The bondholders and BN 
bargained and settled on a deal in 1987 that released the land from the 
terms of the lien and paid the bondholders handsomely for the 
169 Miller, p 6. 
170 Miller, p 6. 
171 Miller, p 6. 
172 Miller, p 6. 
privilege,173 and BN was free to manipulate the profits from the lands 
at will. 
Not wasting any time, BN spun off a subsidiary company called 
Burlington Resources, Inc (BRI) in June of 1988. BRI consisted of the 
non-transportation holdings of the old holding company, including 
Plum Creek and various oil and gas holdings.174 Now energy and 
natural resource investors did not have to put their money into the 
railroad as a necessary side of investing in energy and natural resources 
that the company owned. One eager energy investor, Pennzoil—hot 
off a court settlement with Texaco that had put $2.5 billion cash in its 
pockets—garnered 8% of BRI stock on 6 February, 1989, but listed itself 
as a passive investor. Bressler bristled at what he suspected was "more 
than a passive invest(ment)," and filed suit, alleging that Pennzoil 
misstated its intentions. Nothing came of it, however, because 
Pennzoil sold all of its BRI shares in June of 1989, soon after BRI 
announced in April that it was spinning off its timber operations into a 
new company. Pennzoil spokespeople denied that its selloff was 
related to anything specific, insisting only that it was a good time to 
sell.175 
BRI wanted to divest itself of its timber industry holdings 
because its energy investors found little, if any, added value in the 
timber, and it found itself faced with three options of divestiture that it 
considered viable. Selling all the timber to another timber company 
173 Spokane Spokesman-Review, 21 January 1988, p 1. 
174 Missoulian, 3 June 1988, p 1. 
17^ Missoulian, 21 March 1989, p Bl, and 9 June 1989, p B2. 
was one option, and it had the option of allowing management to 
purchase Plum Creek through a leveraged buy-out. BRI settled on 
establishing a limited partnership that would buy out BRI's timber 
industry holdings.176 By forming a limited partnership, called Plum 
Creek Timber Company, LP, BRI tapped into a 1987 tax law that 
exempts from taxes publicly-traded partnerships that derive 90 per cent 
of their revenue from natural resources.177 To take advantage of the 
tax law, Plum Creek formed two entities, the limited partnership to 
own the natural resources—in Plum Creek's case this was the 
timberland—and a traditional corporation to own the wood products 
manufacturing holdings. The partnership owned 95 per cent of the 
manufacturing corporation, which was a taxable entity. The terms of 
the sale from BRI to Plum Creek, however, burdened the corporation 
with so much debt and interest payments that the mill operated at a 
loss, so it did not have to pay taxes anyway.178 Then, in 1990, the IRS 
ruled that income derived from sawmills constituted qualifying 
income under the natural resource exemption, so sawmills too could 
be owned by tax-exempt limited partnerships.179 Effective 1 January, 
1991, Plum Creek formed a second limited partnership to own the 
manufacturing holdings (Plum Creek Manufacturing, LP) that was 98 
Crooker, 19 November 1991. 
177 Koberstein, Paul. 1990. "Private forests face critical log shortages," Oregonian 
(Portland), 15 October, p 5. Hereinafter "Koberstein 1990a." Plum Creek paid $117.7 
million in federal taxes from 1984-1989, but since formation of the partnership they 
have paid none. 
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transfer, according to the Plum Creek Prospectus, p 43. 
179 Ludwick, jim. 1990. "Who owns Plum Creek these days?," Missoulian, 16 December, 
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per cent owned by Plum Creek Timber Company, LP.180 The old 
manufacturing corporation (now 96 per cent owned by the LP), which 
was renamed Plum Creek Marketing, Inc, would market and distribute 
the products made by the manufacturing LP.181 This remains the 
corporate status of the company today. 
Plum Creek's limited partners had to raise $575 million to 
purchase 88 per cent of BRI's timber entities (BRI opted to retain 12 per 
cent). To gather the money, they borrowed $325 million and raised 
another $284 million by offering 14,202,500 depository units at $20 per 
unit.182 As an added incentive to attract potential partners, BRI 
guaranteed the dividend on the depository units to be a minimum of 
$0.60/unit/quarter for five years, that is, until 1994. Because each 
investor who bought a depository unit was technically one of the 
limited partners, all of the yield on the investment was tax-free.183 For 
the past six quarters, Plum Creek has authorized a distribution of 
$0.80/unit. Profitability has been high enough to exceed the guaranteed 
distribution level.184 
As BN and Plum Creek organized into their various corporate 
forms in the 1980s, timber harvest on its lands in Montana rapidly 
climbed to an apex in 1986, and have slowly declined since then (see 
Figure 2). Nick Kirkmire, a Plum Creek vice president, claimed in 1984 
that, although Plum Creek "may have more intense (cutting) activity 
180 Crooker, 19 November, 1991. 
181 Plum Creek 1990 Annual Report, p 26. 
182 Plum Creek 1990 Annual Report, p 26. 
183 Crooker, 19 November 1991. 
184 Plum Creek October 1991 Profile 
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in some areas..., overall, we're cutting at a level that we feel the lands 
can maintain and still be consistent with good stewardship and good 
forest-management practices."185 What the lands can maintain, 
however, should not be confused with what the lands can sustain, 
because "a sustained yield timber program is not economically feasible 
for Plum Creek," according to Bill Parson. "We are not on a sustained-
yield program. We never said we were on a sustained-yield program, 
and we have never been on a sustained-yield program.... Sure, it is 
extensively logged, but what is wrong with that?"186 Plum Creek 
viewed its accelerated cut as "prudent": 
In the early 1980s, Plum Creek began to accelerate 
the harvesting of its mature and overmature timber, 
consistent with prudent forest management practices, in 
order to capture as much value as possible from older 
timber stands. Harvesting activity of this nature 
encourages new growth on such stands, thereby increasing 
levels of harvestable timber in the future. ...The annual 
rate of timber harvesting is presently declining as the 
process of harvesting mature and overmature timber 
nears completion and is expected to stabilize in 1996... and 
remain at such level for several years thereafter.187 
Because managed stands of timber produce so much more wood fiber 
more quickly than old growth stands, Plum Creek determined it was 
"in its best interests to harvest the timber as quickly as [Plum Creek] can 
get into it and sell it, at least until [Plum Creek] gets out of this old 
growth backlog."188 Productivity in a second-growth stand is generally 
double that of an old-growth stand,189 and Plum Creek wanted to 
Cole, Jeff. 1984. Missoulian, 4 March, p 1. 
186 Morgan, Bill. 1989. "Plum Creek uses tour to explain timber plans," (Kalispell) 
Daily Inter Lake, 15 October, p 1. 
187 Plum Creek Prospectus, p 65. 
188 Manning, Dick. 1988. Missoulian, 16 October, p Bl. 
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convert its natural, old-growth stands to managed, second-growth 
stands.190 
As Plum Creek liquidated its old growth in Montana, a furor 
among the public in Montana arose over the amount Plum Creek 
clearcut on its lands, particularly in the Swan Valley. Plum Creek has 
checkerboard ownership with the USFS in much of the Swan Valley, 
and "now enormous clearcuts, each a square mile in size, dot the 
valley" where Plum Creek has cut.191 However, company records 
indicate that, on annual average from 1981-1991, thirteen per cent of 
management prescriptions in the Swan have been clearcuts, and that 
percentage peaked in 1984, when Plum Creek clearcut 28 per cent of the 
acreage treated.192 In all, Plum Creek records indicate that about 20 per 
cent of its acreage in Montana has been clearcut over the last ten years. 
Foresters prescribed overstory removal cuts and selective cuts for the 
remaining 80 per cent.193 
Plum Creek's change in approach to its timberlands in the 1980s 
was accompanied by a drastic changeover in forestry personnel in 
Montana. The Bressler doctrine of treating the timberlands as assets 
from which to maximize returns resulted in an accelerated old-growth 
liquidation, and some people chose to retire rather than see the 
Farney, Dennis. 1990. "Unkindest Cut? Timber Firm Stirs Ire Felling Forests Faster 
Than They Regenerate." Wall Street journal, 18 June, p 1. 
191 Koberstein, Paul. 1990. "Plum Creek Timber leaves its mark on Montana," Oregonian 
(Portland), 15 October, p 5. Hereinafter "Koberstein 1990b" 
192 Sigars, 3 December 1991. 
193 Sigars, 3 December 1991. Management prescriptions other than clearcuts, for all 
intents and purposes, can often resemble a clearcut. Seed tree and shelter cuts, which 
can leave as few as five trees to an acre, are not technically clearcuts. 
conservation doctrine scrapped; others were laid off or retired early. 
Early in 1984, Plum Creek Timber Company eliminated 15 jobs (about 
25 per cent of the work force) in the Forest Resources Division in 
Montana through a combination of early retirements, layoffs, and 
transfers to the Seattle office.194 
When Leland began working at Plum Creek, he found more 
foresters in place than he thought necessary to get the cut out. 
According to Jim Brady, the extra foresters were left over from the 
Binger days, when all the people were needed to prepare a timber sale 
due to the extensive and involved EIS preparation. After Binger 
retired and BN, Inc formed BN Timberlands, Merryman eliminated 
environmental review as a requirement in timber sale planning. So 
Leland removed the extra personnel.195 According to company 
spokesman Nick Kirkmire, the foresters were removed to create a 
"final change in emphasis from people who are specialists to people 
who are generalists (in forest management) and who have more 
entrepreneurial skills" and to "enhance the firm's competitive 
posture." Plum Creek wanted managers who had a sense of how to 
move timber to market when the market was right for the timber. The 
company became less interested in forestry from its foresters and more 
interested in marketing ability and entrepreneurship from its foresters, 
and put people in the position of forester who could match the new 
needs of the company.196 Bob Binger, who had guided these foresters 
when he was in charge of resources, felt that Plum Creek "didn't want 
194 Cole, p 1. 
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to go through the throes of trying to change people's mindsets about 
what they thought was right and wrong. The easiest way to do that was 
to terminate them and hire foresters who would do their bidding."197 
Foresters on Plum Creek lands today form harvest plans 
"jointly" with executives in the company.198 Foresters inform 
executives "how much timber there is, and [executives] tell foresters 
how much to cut."199 Plum Creek foresters no longer rely on Timber 
RAM, the harvest scheduling computer model. Plum Creek foresters 
maintain that "inventory is getting to the point where we know a lot 
more about what we have today, and we use our own system and a 
little intuition."200 Computers are unable to handle the constraints 
that foresters have to handle today: "Computers can't measure public 
sentiment."201 The stated primary objectives of Plum Creek forest 
management today are to "meet financial obligations, produce a return 
for shareholders and do it in an environmentally sensitive way."202 
In areas they know to be sensitive, Plum Creek foresters take 
more care in their consideration of fisheries, soil stability, watershed 
concerns, wildlife, and aesthetics. However, "most of [Plum Creek's] 
197 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
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sensitive areas are due to people/' and foresters find themselves 
responding to visual constraints and public relations constraints more 
often than to any other considerations in planning timber cuts.203 
Since 1990, Plum Creek has been using fewer clearcuts "due to more 
sensitivity to public opinion/' and is "trying to find other ways to do it 
instead of making people mad at [it] all the time."204 To this end, 
Plum Creek foresters practice partial cutting on over 80 per cent of their 
lands in the Rocky Mountains. This is partially due to the types of 
timber and landforms encountered by foresters, but it is also due to a 
greater environmental and social sensitivity. Plum Creek does 
clearcut, and does think it is a good forestry practice, but wherever it 
clearcuts, it clearcuts "consciously," because its foresters "feel it is the 
right thing to do."205 
Several newspaper and magazine stories covering the extent and 
severity of the company's clearcutting "slam-dunked" Plum Creek, 
according to Bill Parson: "Not everyone is out to tell a favorable story 
or a positive story or even an honest story about Plum Creek."206 An 
unfavorable feature in the Wall Street Journal on 18 June, 1990, led to a 
ten per cent drop in the price of Plum Creek depository units on the 
New York Stock Exchange.207 Plum Creek considers the negative press 
exposure largely a result of ineffective public relations work,208 but also 
203 Johnson, 20 November 1991. 
204 Crooker, 19 November 1991. 
Brady, 20 November 1991. 
206 parson/ Bill. 1991. Telephone Interview. Director of Timberland Operations, Plum 
Creek Timber Company, Columbia Falls, Montana. 
207 Missoulian, 20 June 1990, p CI. 
208 parney^ p \ 
acknowledges the general public's aversion to its methods of operation, 
and is seeking alternatives that are more palatable to the public.209 
Plum Creek is now limiting its clearcuts to 90 acres and 
experimenting with "New Forestry," a system of harvesting that takes 
more than wood production into account. Jerry Franklin, a USFS 
researcher, came to the conclusion through studies began in 1970 that 
"what was good for wood production wasn't necessarily good for other 
forest values."210 Plum Creek, which had received primarily negative 
press for its harvesting methods, decided to employ Franklin's New 
Forestry techniques on about 20 per cent of its lands — the 20 per cent 
that it would normally clearcut.211 Loggers leave about 25 per cent of 
the stand's value on the ground, leave some snags, and leave slash for 
biomass retention instead of piling and burning it. New Forestry also 
allows for re-inoculation of stands quicker than clearcutting and 
broadcast burning, and over the long run, can protect and increase the 
overall productivity of a timber stand.212 Plum Creek chairman Dave 
Leland decided to employ these techniques because he did not think it 
was "appropriate to stick our heads in the sand and do things the way 
we've always done them."213 Denny Sigars, manager of Plum Creek's 
Missoula district, maintains that Plum Creek's use of New Forestry is 
"not a publicity stunt. But if you have a public relations problem and a 
209 Koberstein, 1990b, p 5. 
2^' Durbin, Kathie and Paul Koberstein. 1990. "New Forestry: Trying logging with a 
lighter touch," Oregonian (Portland), 15 October, p 21. Hereinafter "Durbin." 
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213 Durbin, p 22. 
scientifically-developed approach coincides with the public relations 
problem, a firm would be insane not to utilize it."214 
Plum Creek foresters today find their greatest expression of 
freedom in management decisions through growing trees.215 Tree 
planting, maintenance, and repair work is "all pretty much up to the 
foresters."216 According to Denny Sigars, Plum Creek foresters have 
concentrated their efforts on getting superior reforestation results. 
Foresters allow about 70 per cent of the acreage to regenerate naturally, 
and they plant about 30 per cent. Normally, foresters allow selectively 
logged stands to regenerate naturally, and plant clearcuts; this, 
however, varies with the site and species. Lodgepole pine clearcuts, for 
example, regenerate best with a broadcast burn that opens the 
lodgepole's serotinous cones.217 Plum Creek grows its seedlings for 
planting in a large nursery in Pablo, Montana. Seeds for the seedlings 
are matched by zone and elevation to the site where planters will 
eventually site them, and usually seeds for the future plantings come 
from the same drainage in which the seedlings will be planted. This 
heightens the chances for restocking success.218 Plum Creek foresters 
pay so much attention to reforestation success because "we can't spend 
as much money as we do on reforestation and then not let the trees 
214 Sigars, 3 December 1991. 
215 Johnson, 20 November 1991. 
216 Johnson, 20 November 1991. 
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About 80 per cent of the volume of the trees harvested on Plum 
Creek lands in Montana go to Plum Creek mills for processing. The 
mills fill about 60 per cent of their capacity from company lands, and 
buy the remainder from the USFS or other private holdings. Foresters 
try to fill the needs of the company mills as much as possible. Douglas 
fir logs, if larger than eight inches, go to the sawmills, and if smaller, go 
to stud mills. All peeler logs harvested go to Plum Creek's plywood 
plant, and all pine, spruce, and cedar logs (the "board" species) are sent 
to the sawmills. Lodgepole pine, most of which comes from the 
Gallatin district, gets shipped to the company's Belgrade stud mill. 
Plum Creek then sells the remaining 20 per cent of the logs that do not 
fit the needs of their mills.220 
Plum Creek mills are now among the most advanced in the 
industry,221 and the company has tooled its mills to the "specialty" 
market.222 Instead of producing commodity timber — the timber 
normally associated with frame construction for the housing market — 
Plum Creek has targeted the specialty market for its wood products. 
The company markets directly to home improvement centers, where 
do-it-yourself home remodelers tend to shop for wood products. Do-
it-yourselfers generally use higher quality materials than builders, so 
Plum Creek concentrates on milling highest quality studs and boards 
and marketing them to home improvement centers.223 Plum Creek 
also manufactures carpet strip, marine-grade plywood, RV-grade 
220 Sigars, 3 December 1991. 
221 Koberstein 1990a, p 5. 
222 Crooker, 19 November 1991. 
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plywood, and high quality van liner — all specialty market targets. 
Company mills also can cut metric sizes to tap the export market, 
which, at the moment, is solely Japan. Plum Creek's marketing 
strategy is to bypass wholesalers and place the company's products 
closer to "the ultimate consumer or the ultimate point of sale."224 
According to Charlie Grenier, Plum Creek vice president for the 
Rocky Mountain Region, the company is "in a business where raw 
material is available only if you're an efficient producer. [Plum Creek's] 
goal is to be the low-cost producer in the markets [it] serves."225 
Survival in the wood-products industry in Montana is generally 
considered to be problematic, so Plum Creek is tightening its efficiency 
so that it will be the "survivor of the crunch that will occur in the 
industry."226 The crunch that the industry expects is a tightening of the 
timber supply to feed the area's mills. As the two large landholders in 
Montana, Champion International and Plum Creek, pursued old-
growth liquidation programs, they both did so fully aware that there 
would be a "gap" in timber supply between the period when they 
finished cutting old growth and when the second growth rotations 
would be ready for harvest.227 "Private overcutting makes no sense 
unless the companies expect to fill with government timber the 'gap' in 
private supply that will inevitably result."228 
224 Hopkins, Roger. 1988. Missoulian, 29 May, p Bl. 
225 Woodruff, Steve. 1989. "Plum Creek throws down gauntlet," Missoulian, 28 May, p 
Fl .  
226 Woodruff, p Fl. 
227 McQuillan, 11 November 1991. 
228 Reinhardt, Forest Lee. 1990. "Forest Products Firms and Their Timber Suppliers: 
Essays in Economic Organization and Behavior." (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts) p 163. 
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Plum Creek plans to decrease harvest from its own lands by 33 
per cent by 1996, and expects to make up the difference by purchasing 
USFS timber: "...the General Partner expects the Facilities Subsidiary 
will purchase an increasing amount of timber from the US Forest 
Service and other third party sources to support its requirements for 
the Conversion Facilities. The General Partner believes that the close 
proximity of the Timberlands to US Forest Service acreage has given 
Plum Creek a competitive advantage in obtaining US Forest Service 
timber."229 
Plum Creek has no mills in the western Cascades of 
Washington, and exports most of the logs cut from that region.230 The 
export market was very favorable in the 1980s for Plum Creek, and left 
them "flush" with profits. Plum Creek also found higher profit 
margins in the specialty markets that it targeted, and this also 
contributed to its increased operating income.231 Additionally, Plum 
Creek had a competitive edge over other companies because it had a 
higher profit margin and recovery rate for each tree it logged because it 
could process the tree in its own mills. These profits allowed Plum 
Creek to be able to outbid competing mills for USFS timber now,232 and 
Plum Creek expects to be able to outbid competitors for federal timber 
in the future when its own timber harvest wanes in the 1990s.233 In 
short, Plum Creek is ready to compete over the long haul. 
229 plum Creek Prospectus, p 65. 
23® Brady, 20 November 1991. 
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CONCLUSION 
Private companies in the US generally try to manage their assets 
to maximize their profits. When changes in its internal corporate 
environment removed several constraints to timber harvest levels, 
and with the external corporate environment pushing the company to 
protect itself by maximizing its returns on investments, Plum Creek 
responded by accelerating the liquidation of its timber assets in 
Montana in the early 1980s. 
By 1982, Plum Creek had overcome the constraints that had 
limited its timber harvest in Montana, and it initiated an accelerated 
old-growth liquidation program. Access to the timber, which posed the 
largest constraint in the 50s and 60s, was no longer an inhibiting 
concern by 1982. An extensive road network covered Plum Creek 
lands, and cost-share agreements with the USFS allowed Plum Creek to 
reach more remote stands of its timber economically. Technological 
advances in the logging industry also increased access to Plum Creek 
timber that would not have been economical to cut with earlier tree 
cutting, bucking, and loading equipment. 
Markets for the timber that grew on PC lands were well-
established by 1982. Early harvests had concentrated on stands covered 
with Ponderosa pine, western larch, and Douglas fir, but markets for 
Engleman spruce and lodgepole pine (species that predominate in 
about 25 per cent of Plum Creek's Rocky Mountain timberland) 
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developed over time until these species were profitable to cut and mill 
on a large scale. 
Passage of the Staggers Act in 1980 and the consequent formation 
of the BN holding company allowed management of the company's 
timberlands to escape the regulatory grip of the ICC. Railroad 
deregulation gave the BN the opportunity to separate its various profit 
centers into separate companies. Previously, all railroad holdings were 
subject to the stringent ICC regulations governing railroads. 
The most powerful constraint that held Plum Creek timber 
cutting levels in check was Bob Binger. Binger's forestry philosophy 
predicated a sustained-yield harvest schedule, which guaranteed a 
given level of harvest each year into perpetuity at the expense of 
maximizing short-term profits. Because of his powerful position in 
the company hierarchy, President of BN Resources, Binger was able to 
guide company forestry policy until his retirement upon the formation 
of the BN holding company in 1981. Dick Bressler then took over 
direction of the company. Bressler, unlike Binger, chose to maximize 
returns on the company's timber assets in the short run rather than 
trying to assure sustained leveled of harvest in perpetuity. 
In addition to the internal constraints to accelerated timber 
cutting, Plum Creek responded to the corporate environment in which 
it found itself in the early 1980s by maximizing its returns on its assets 
to keep stock and dividend prices high to discourage hostile takeovers. 
The threat of hostile takeovers also influenced the company to 
liquidate its assets to make the company less attractive as a takeover 
target. (Interestingly, Lou Menk, who remained on the board of 
directors of BN, Inc until 1986, did not think that BN Timberlands or 
later, Plum Creek, were ever in any danger of a takeover. In addition, 
in 1991, Forest Reinhardt of the Harvard Business School, in a study of 
forest products firms and their timber suppliers, found that although 
anecdotal information "suggests that there may a positive correlation 
between the probability that a firm is the object of a takeover and the 
magnitude of its timberland assets," formal analysis reveals no such 
relationship.)1 
After the BN reached a settlement with the bondholders of long-
term liens on its land holdings to escape the terms of the bond, the 
company restructured itself several times to streamline its bureaucracy, 
to take advantage of changing tax laws, and to leverage itself out of 
takeover desirability. The end result is that what was once a mostly-
ignored asset of a large railroad company is now a separate timber and 
wood-products company. 
By liquidating its old growth timber, Plum Creek increased its 
profitability, and the company plans to use these profits to out-compete 
other mills for federal timber when its own harvest diminishes in the 
mid-1990s. However, as its old-growth liquidation program nears 
completion, Plum Creek will be increasingly dependent on outside 
sources of timber for its mills, and will no longer have the cushion of 
its own timber base on which to fall back if other sources of timber 
1 Reinhardt, p 236. 
(primarily the USFS) run out.2 As it accelerated its cut to the apparent 
disregard of all considerations other than wood production, Plum 
Creek picked up the reputation as the "Darth Vader" of the timber 
industry: the bad guys. As Binger suggests, however, the best public 
relations is to treat the land well; regardless of whatever media control 
Plum Creek may have, if it treats its lands badly, it will have poor 
public relations.3 But now that the bulk of its old growth is already cut 
and the end of its old growth rotation is imminent, Plum Creek is 
slowing its cut and concurrently spending more time with social and 
environmental concerns and public relations campaigns. 
Plum Creek is certainly in the timber production and wood-
products industry for the long term, but not necessarily at its current 
level.4 It will out-compete its less monied and more inefficient 
competitors for an increasingly limited federal timber supply, and all 
indications point to the company's survival until its own second-
growth rotations will be old enough to harvest. Projected changes in 
the industry — an increasing dependence on fiber and strand 
composite products rather than planks, beams, and boards — may 
decrease the rotation age for the second growth, as firms turn to fiber 
production — which can come from small trees — instead of board 
2 The USFS has declared timber harvest moratoria in several checkerboard ownership 
drainages because of cumulative effects concerns due to previous Plum Creek and/or 
Champion harvests in the drainage. Plum Creek thus has acted to make federal timber 
less available for itself to cut because of its management on its own adjacent land. 
3-v Binger, 8 February 1992. 
4 Plum Creek is currently engaged in negotiations with the Nature Conservancy to 
purchase most of its Gallatin-area operations, including the Belgrade mill, which the 
Nature Conservancy would presumably close. Plum Creek is also planning several land 
exchanges and sales in this lodgepole-dominated zone, and assumably will close all of 
its operations in this area if the sales and transfers occur. 
production — which must come from bigger trees. Trees do grow and 
utilization standards keep falling, so it tends to keep timber firms 
operating longer than they might have anticipated, and it may also 
bring Plum Creek's second-growth into utilization sooner than 
planned.5 
The essential changes in the management of the company's 
timberlands occurred in first following WWII, when the railroad 
decided to retain and manage its timberlands, and hence hired 
foresters, such as Merryman and eventually Binger to oversee 
management of the lands. This stewardship period lasted until 1981, 
when Bressler took over from Binger. Binger considered management 
policy and objectives with the very long term in mind — he managed 
for perpetuity. As a forester, Binger's management of the timberlands 
for sustained yields into perpetuity paralleled the age-old railroader 
mentality that it was in one's own self-interest to protect the shippers 
and the commodities. From a purely short-term profit view, this is a 
less-than-efficient approach, but its horizon is always very long-term. 
The shift in management from Binger to Bressler marked the 
shift from the tenets of forestry playing the dominant role in 
management of the company's timberlands to business considerations 
governing the management of the timberlands. Forestry wasn't 
necessarily out to maximize profits from the timber assets, and 
recognized other values that were important enough to nurture, 
protect, and sustain. The interests of business management, on the 
^ Brady, 20 November 1991. 
other hand, recognize only the maximizing of profitability from timber 
assets, with no real concern or consideration for any other values 
attached to the timber assets that may not be easily measured in dollars. 
By the admission of the foresters themselves, forestry played only a 
minor role, if any, in the management of Plum Creek timber lands in 
the 1980s: "A lot of people were afraid to admit that we were doing this 
from an economic standpoint. I wasn't afraid to because I figured what 
I was doing was good for society. My feeling was the trees are there and 
they should contribute to the welfare of man; we should use them, just 
like we use steel, gasoline and electricity. It just so happens it was also 
good for economics."6 
But Bob Binger cautions that, "The forestry profession is going to 
be passe if more forestry people don't begin to look beyond the trees."7 
For Plum Creek and its economic-driven harvest in the 1980s, the 
forestry profession was already mostly passe. 
6 Brady, 20 November 1991. 
7 Binger, 26 November 1991. 
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